High-Powered Microwaves for Boost Phase Intercept by Horgan, Christopher James et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) Major Qualifying Projects
October 2010
High-Powered Microwaves for Boost Phase
Intercept
Christopher James Horgan
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Justin Edward Fraize
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Matthew Stephen Sirocki
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Major Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Major Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Horgan, C. J., Fraize, J. E., & Sirocki, M. S. (2010). High-Powered Microwaves for Boost Phase Intercept. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/mqp-all/3884
HIGH-POWERED MICROWAVES FOR BOOST PHASE INTERCEPT 
 
MAJOR QUALIFYING PROJECT REPORT: 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY 
OF THE 
WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE  
BY 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
 JUSTIN FRAIZE CHRISTOPHER HORGAN MATTHEW SIROCKI 
 ECE PHYSICS ECE 
 
DATE:  OCTOBER 21,  2010 
 
APPROVED: 
 
 
                                                                                                          
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR EDWARD A.  CLANCY 
ELECTRICAL &  COMPUTER ENGINEERING  
 
 
                                                                                                          
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR GERMANO S.  IANNACCHIONE  
PHYSICS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This report represents the work of one or more WPI undergraduate students  
submitted to the faculty as evidence of completion of a degree requirement.  
WPI routinely publishes these reports on its web site without editorial  or peer review.  
2 
 
Abstract 
The United States military currently lacks a defense system capable of intercepting 
an intercontinental ballistic missile during boost phase. Missiles typically spend less than 
five minutes in boost, rendering traditional approaches, which utilize nuclear and kinetic 
tipped interceptors, infeasible due to their required flight times. Directed energy weapons, 
however, promise to overcome the tight timing constraints of boost phase by propagating 
at the speed of light. Specifically, the use of directed high-powered microwaves for boost 
phase interception is an interesting proposition. Microwaves may be used to achieve a 
“mission kill” by inducing failure of a missile’s navigational electronics via electromagnetic 
pulses. The energy required for a high-powered microwave to be effective is three orders 
of magnitude lower than the energy required by the Boeing Airborne Laser, another 
directed energy weapon. This paper details a coverage-based analysis of high-powered 
microwave systems, drawing conclusions of system feasibility and future interest. 
Analysis software was developed to calculate the effectiveness of directed high-
powered microwaves in a ballistic missile defense context. Analysis showed space basing to 
be infeasible with current technology, requiring hundreds to thousands of orbital 
platforms. On the other hand, ground basing analysis showed promising results, requiring 
only one to five ground-based regional platforms to cover small countries, and would 
require no radical advances in technology. However, these conclusions are highly 
dependent on key assumptions about a target’s vulnerability to an applied high-powered 
microwave. To address these assumptions, further research is necessary to quantify an 
ICBM’s actual vulnerability. 
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Executive Summary 
Since the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile, the idea of using directed 
energy weapons has long captured the imaginations of ballistic missile defense designers. 
The United States military currently lacks a deployed defense system capable of 
intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile during boost phase. Missiles typically 
spend less than five minutes in boost phase, rendering traditional approaches which utilize 
kinetic kill missiles infeasible due to the required close-in flight times. Directed energy 
weapons, however, overcome the tight timing constraints of boost phase interception by 
propagating to a target at the speed of light. While directed energy weapons remove some 
of the issues faced by traditional interceptors, the technical challenge of focusing and 
delivering sufficient power on a target missile has contributed to a lack of progress in 
directed energy weapons. Recent technological advances in areas such as power generation 
and energy storage, however, give cause to re-evaluate the feasibility of directed energy 
weapon systems in a missile defense context. 
E.1. Problem Statement 
There were two main goals for this project. The first objective was the development 
of a MATLAB analysis tool called MECSTAR (Modeling Effective Coverage for a 
Stellar/Terrestrial Advanced Response) for the purpose of modeling the effectiveness of 
both ground and space-based high-powered microwave (HPM) systems in a ballistic 
missile defense context. The second objective was to perform a coverage-based analysis of 
using MECSTAR for both ground and space-based HPM systems. For ground-basing, the 
analysis deliverable being the number of ground stations required for regional ballistic 
missile defense coverage, and for the case of space-basing, the number of orbital platforms 
required for worldwide coverage. 
E.2. High-Powered Microwave Systems 
It is postulated that a high-powered microwave, when fired at a boosting ICBM, 
would disable or disrupt a missile’s navigational electronics. Ideally, this disruption of 
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navigational or other mission critical components would be enough to induce a “mission 
kill,” rendering the ballistic missile unable to meet its operational objectives. Research into 
the baseline capabilities of high-powered microwaves revealed that their effectiveness is 
highly dependent upon the assumed vulnerability of a target, i.e. the level of intensity 
(power per unit area) required for disruption a target’s navigational systems. This intensity 
can be as low as          and as high as        . To account for this range, three 
distinct Vulnerability Models are used which correspond to specific intensity levels from 
this spectrum. 
 
Figure E.2.a: Vulnerability Model Intensities 
Three Vulnerability Models, which correspond to intensities of        ⁄ ,       ⁄ , and       ⁄ , are used 
to address the range of intensities found to disrupt electronics systems. 
These Vulnerability Models, which correspond to intensities of        ⁄ , 
     ⁄ , and           ⁄ , represent estimates for the minimum required intensity 
which a high-powered microwave system must deliver onto a target in order to achieve a 
mission kill. 
E.3. Calculating Effective System Ranges 
The maximum vacuum range (    ) represents the farthest a microwave beam can 
propagate while delivering a level of intensity no less than the minimum required intensity 
(    ) for a mission kill. To calculate     , the range of a microwave beam was modeled as a 
function of the system parameters antenna diameter (     ), operating frequency 
(      ), source power (     ), electromagnetic shielding of the target (             ), 
and the minimum required intensity (    ). This model for the vacuum range of a system is 
shown by Eq. (E.3.a) below. 
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As can be seen, increasing the system parameters of antenna diameter ( ), operating 
frequency ( ), and source power ( ) have a positive effect on the maximum vacuum range 
(    ). Furthermore, increasing the system parameters of electromagnetic shielding (  ) 
and minimum required intensity (    ) have a negative effect on     . 
For space-based systems, the maximum vacuum range defines the maximum system 
range because attenuation due to the atmosphere is negligible. For ground-based systems, 
however, atmospheric attenuation must also be accounted for because the path to the 
target contains levels of dense atmosphere. An atmospheric attenuation model sourced 
from NASA was used which provides the total attenuation (         ) caused by dry air, 
water vapor, rain, and cloud cover at a given altitude ( ) above the surface. For all altitudes 
passed through by a beam, the total attenuation is summed to determine the maximum 
system range of a ground-based system. 
The maximum system ranges of both ground and space-based systems, however, are 
not equal to their respective effective ranges. The effective range of an HPM system is a 
subset of the maximum range, and is defined by a missile’s critical altitude (  ). An ICBM 
flying a downrange distance of 5,500 kilometers (the minimum distance to qualify as an 
ICBM) has a characteristic altitude (  ) and time (  ) for when it leaves boost phase (the 
first phase of a missile’s flight).  Additionally, there exists a time margin (  ) in which an 
HPM system must engage an ICBM prior to the completion of boost phase in order to 
induce enough navigational error to qualify for a mission kill.  The altitude corresponding 
to the end of boost time (  ) minus the margin time (  ) is called the critical altitude.  The 
critical altitude describes the greatest height that an ICBM travelling 5,500 kilometers can 
be hit during the boost phase while still providing a great enough margin to induce a 
mission killing error. The effective system range of both ground and space-based platforms 
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is defined by the intersection of their respective maximum system ranges with a ballistic 
missile’s critical altitude. 
E.4. System Coverage Results 
Shown below in Figure E.4.a for Vulnerability Model 2, the maximum (dotted lines) 
and effective (shaded areas) ranges of a high-powered microwave system are plotted for a 
given set of system parameters for a critical altitude of       . 
 
Figure E.4.a: Ground-Based Results - Vulnerability Model 2 - Sweeping Electromagnetic Shielding 
Cross-sections of the maximum system range (dotted lines) and of the effective system range (shaded in) are 
plotted for a system deployed on a spherical model of the Earth. Each dotted line represents the maximum range 
using 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50 dB of shielding attenuation. 
Shown above, the electromagnetic shielding is swept across a 20 dB range to 
produce five different range “bubbles.” The maximum downrange, i.e. the farthest distance 
from the system that can be covered as measured along the surface of the Earth, 
corresponds to a shielding level of       and is calculated to be       . For Vulnerability 
Models 1 and 3, the maximum downranges were          and          respectively. 
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For space-based results coverage was calculated on a global scale. Figure E.4.b 
below shows the total number of satellites required for a given HPM system range. 
 
Figure E.4.b: Total Satellites for Global Coverage vs. Effective Range 
The number of satellites required for continuous global coverage is a strong inverse function of the effective 
range. The range of Vulnerability Model 2 is highlighted, with a maximum range of           corresponding to 
                . 
Shown above, 1,856 satellites are needed to achieve continuous global coverage for 
Vulnerability Model 2. Not visible on the scale, Vulnerability Model 1 necessitates two 
satellites, each covering an entire hemisphere. Finally, for Vulnerability Model 3, the 
number of satellites is undefined, as the range of the HPM system is only         , and is 
incapable of reaching the critical altitude of        from the system’s orbital altitude of 
      . 
E.5. Conclusions 
The ambiguity of required intensity levels highlights the need for further research. 
Therefore, only general conclusions are made; space-basing is currently infeasible, 
requiring hundreds to thousands of orbital platforms when considering any required 
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intensity levels aside from the lowest estimates. Ground-basing, however, has more 
promise being as stationary systems can be larger in size while requiring fewer 
installments to counter regional threats. When using moderate intensity estimates, small 
countries like Iran and North Korea need four or fewer high-powered microwave stations 
in the vicinity to ensure coverage. When using the upper bound of intensity estimates, both 
ground and space systems would require significant advances in technology to realize 
practical ranges. However, as mentioned previously, before any consideration is made to 
pursue high-powered microwave solutions for ballistic missile threats, empirical testing 
must be done to determine the actual intensity required for a mission kill on an in-flight 
boosting ICBM. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the idea of using 
directed energy weapons (DEWs) has long captured the imaginations of ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) policy makers. The United States military currently lacks a defense system 
capable of intercepting an intercontinental ballistic missile during boost phase. Missiles 
typically spend less than five minutes in boost, rendering traditional approaches, which 
utilize nuclear interceptors and kinetic kill vehicles, infeasible due to their required flight 
times. Directed energy weapons, however, promise to overcome the tight timing 
constraints of boost phase by propagating at the speed of light. 
While, DEWs remove some of the issues faced by traditional interceptors, the 
technical challenge of focusing and delivering sufficient power to a target missile has 
contributed to a lack of progress in DEWs. Ultimately, it is due to these difficulties that 
public, political, and private interests in such systems have waned. Thus, while DEWs have 
continually fallen short of their original deployment goals, kinetic kill vehicles have become 
the current mechanism used in United States BMD (Parrington, 1997). Today, despite the 
previous shortcomings of DEWs, there exists continued research interest with respect to 
DEW platforms and their place within a BMD context (Defense Science Board, 2007). 
Specifically, as technological advances occur in areas such as power generation and energy 
storage, it is appropriate to re-evaluate the feasibility of previously considered DEW 
systems. 
1.1 Project Area 
Of the DEW programs currently undergoing research and development by the 
Department of Defense, most can be separated into two distinct groups: high-energy lasers 
(HELs), and high-powered microwaves (HPMs). The effects of these technologies range 
from the disruption to the complete destruction of a target. HEL systems, like the Airborne 
Laser for example, attempt to induce enough structural damage during the boost phase of 
an ICBM to physically destroy it (Barton, et al., 2004). While an HEL system causes damage 
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via the transfer of thermal energy, HPM systems are effective via electromagnetic radiation. 
It is postulated that an HPM, when fired at a boosting ICBM, would disable or disrupt 
electronic equipment. Ideally, this disruption of navigational or other mission critical 
components would be enough to induce a mission kill, rendering the ballistic missile 
unable to meet its operational objectives. 
As noted by a 2007 Defense Science Board report, HPM programs remain “the 
preferred solution for many nonlethal applications to include active denial, vehicle denial, 
and electronic defeat systems.” Several factors contribute to the effectiveness of an HPM 
system. Investigations into an HPM's value must incorporate all of the distinct phases 
through which the propagating wave travels and make note of how each event drives the 
output and is constrained by the input. An image illustrating a simplified process for wave 
propagation can be seen in Figure1.1.a below. 
 
Figure1.1.a: Source-to-Target Response 
The propagation of an electromagnetic wave can be broken down into several distinct phases such as source, 
antenna, propagation, penetration, coupling, and response. (Defense Science Board, 2007) 
For modeling the effectiveness of an HPM against a given target, each stage's qualities (e.g. 
shielding attenuation and signal divergence) must be quantified. Depending on the 
granularity required, creating these models can be a tremendous undertaking. As the 
purpose of this project was an assessment of viability, a first order approximation is 
considered to be sufficient. 
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1.2 Specific Problem and Justification 
As mentioned previously, the United States has no deployed system to intercept 
ICBMs in boost phase. Instead, the United States relies on forms of mid-course interception 
which have inherent drawbacks. These drawbacks include having to discern between real 
and dummy warheads, a reduced target profile due to stage shedding, and additional 
countermeasures such as chaff. The ballistic nature of mid-course leaves the warheads free 
to engage in unpredictable evasive maneuvers and, additionally, a failure to intercept 
during mid-course would leave little to no time to re-engage the warheads. Boost phase 
interception, however, deals with only a single target, because the ICBM has yet to 
separate. Furthermore, evasive maneuvers are rarely seen in boost phase as the flight path 
of an ICBM before entering a ballistic trajectory must be tightly controlled in order to 
achieve the required terminal accuracy. Finally, a significant light and heat signature 
enhances threat detection and tracking. 
The primary hindrance of using kinetic interceptors for boost phase defense is the 
short amount of time an ICBM spends thrusting, which is on the order of minutes. Given the 
flight time of an interceptor missile, as well as the time it takes to detect the threat, the 
combined total often exceeds the total time spent in boost, making interception impossible. 
DEWs such as HPMs propagate at the speed of light, however, and it is this strength which 
makes them well suited for boost phase ICBM defense. 
1.3 Detailed Project Goals 
There were two main goals for this project. The first objective was the development 
of a MATLAB analysis tool called MECSTAR (Modeling Effective Coverage for a 
Stellar/Terrestrial Advanced Response) for the purpose of modeling the effectiveness of 
both ground and space-based HPM systems in a BMD context. The second objective was to 
demonstrate the use of this tool in an analysis of design feasibility. 
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The MATLAB analysis tool MECSTAR was to be capable of addressing both ground 
and space-based platforms. To accomplish this goal, it was to account for the following 
parameters: 
 Transmission power 
 Power per unit area requirements on target 
 Signal attenuation due to atmosphere for ground-based systems 
 Signal attenuation due to shielding 
 Signal divergence due to frequency 
 Orbital altitude for space-based systems 
 Microwave antenna diameter 
 Boost margin time 
 Curvature of the Earth 
Furthermore, the tool was to output the following information after performing its 
analysis: 
 Effective range profile 
 Minimum number of satellites required to provide continuous worldwide 
coverage 
 Coverage map for ground-based systems 
 Dynamic relational graphs for system parameters 
The mechanism of action of our proposed HPM system is to achieve a “mission kill” 
by inducing failure of a missile’s navigational electronics via electromagnetic pulses. Using 
MECSTAR, which was developed in the first phase of the project, the aforementioned 
analysis of design feasibility was to be approached in a coverage-based context. By 
determining the number of installments required to achieve various levels of coverage, 
conclusions of a system’s potential feasibility may be drawn. In performing this analysis, 
the values of the HPM system parameters considered were constrained to the range of 
values found in unclassified literature. 
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2 Background  
In order to provide a baseline of comparative effectiveness of both ground and 
space-based high-powered microwave (HPM) systems in a ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
context, background research on ballistic missiles and the physics of their operation, with a 
specific focus on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Additionally, BMD history and explored 
defense technologies were investigated. Finally, high-powered microwaves and the 
corresponding nature of ground and space-based realms of platform deployment were 
examined. 
2.1 Ballistic Missiles 
Missiles, of which ballistic missiles are a subset, can be classified by their respective 
mechanisms of travel. While some missiles travel to their target by continuously thrusting, 
a ballistic missile travels to its target via a short initial thrust which is followed by a long 
ballistic phase. Ballistic, in this context, means that the trajectory of the missile is gravity 
driven rather than thrust driven. Ballistic missiles have existed in their modern definition 
since World War II. Germany’s V-2, the first ballistic missile used in combat, set the stage 
for future advancements in missile technology when it was initially deployed in 1944. 
(Calow & Zaloga, 2003) 
Ballistic missiles are classified by their maximum range, which is defined as the 
“maximum distance measured along the surface of the earth’s ellipsoid from the point of 
launch … to the point of impact of the last element of its payload” (Federation of American 
Scientists, 2000). Today, countries capable of deploying ballistic missiles use a number of 
classification schemes. For example, the classification schemes of the United States and the 
Russian Federation are shown in Table 2.1.a below. 
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United States of America 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)  5,500 km ≤ range 
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)  3,000 km ≤ range < 5,500 km 
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) 1,000 km ≤ range < 3,000 km 
Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)  0 km ≤ range < 1,000 km 
 
Soviet Union/Russian Federation 
Strategic   1,000 km ≤ range 
Operational-Strategic   500 km ≤ range < 1,000 km 
Operational   300 km ≤ range < 500 km 
Operational-Tactical   50 km ≤ range < 300 km 
Table 2.1.a: Ballistic missile classification schemes of the United States and the Russian Federation 
The United States’ system broadly classifies all ballistic missiles into four categories while the Russian scheme 
uses five categories over a smaller range of distances (Federation of American Scientists, 2000). 
For a missile to be classified as ballistic, it must follow a ballistic trajectory once 
completing a relatively short period of thrust. The maximum speed reached at burn-out, 
the point at which thrust ends, varies with the type of ballistic missile. Short-range ballistic 
missiles (SRBMs), such as the Iraqi Scuds used in the Gulf War, may exceed four times the 
speed of sound (       ⁄ ) at burn-out. ICBMs, however, can reach speeds over seven 
kilometers per second (American Physical Society, 1987). Although short-range ballistic 
missiles have been used to great effect in a number of conflicts, this project focused on 
ICBMs. 
2.1.1 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
As shown in Table 2.1.a above, the United States classifies a missile as an ICBM if it 
has a range exceeding 5,500 kilometers. In addition to a greatly extended range, ICBMs 
differ from other ballistic missiles in their flight stages, propulsion, and guidance systems. 
2.1.1.1 Flight Stages 
The flight of an ICBM has three distinct phases: boost, mid-course, and terminal. 
These phases are depicted below in Figure 2.1.a. 
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Figure 2.1.a: ICBM Flight Phases 
This figure shows the three distinct phases of an ICBM's flight. Time and distance traveled increases from left to 
right. Phase order is boost, mid-course, and then terminal. 
Boost phase may last up to five minutes, primarily dependent on fuel type and target 
distance. During the boost phase, the missile sheds spent fuel stages and makes course 
corrections based on guidance system data. Boost phase ends when the missile has finished 
propelling and all fuel stages have detached from the payload. The mid-course phase 
follows the boost phase and may last up to twenty-two minutes, defining the longest phase 
of an ICBM’s flight. During mid-course, the ICBM may deploy decoys or multiple warheads, 
and may apex at an altitude up to 1,200 kilometers. The terminal phase is the last phase of 
an ICBM’s flight, starting when the ICBM reenters Earth’s atmosphere and finishing when 
the warheads have hit their targets. Terminal is the shortest phase, lasting less than one 
minute.  (American Physical Society, 1987) 
2.1.1.2 Propulsion Systems 
ICBMs are fueled with either liquid or solid propellant. Most countries that possess 
ICBMs use liquid-fueled designs due to their simplicity. However, this simplicity comes at 
the cost of longer burn times (around four to five minutes) as compared to their solid-fuel 
counterparts. This elongated time window allows for better tracking measurements and 
fewer restrictions on response times. Solid-fueled ICBMs have a boost phase that lasts 
approximately three minutes, making time constraints much more difficult to overcome 
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(Barton, et al., 2004). According to an American Physical Society report on boost phase 
intercept, it is expected that most small nuclear powers will possess solid fuel capabilities 
within the next 15-20 years (Barton, et al., 2004). This report also suggests that ICBMs with 
burn times of only two minutes are possible in the near future, rendering almost all kinetic 
kill vehicles ineffective for boost phase intercept. 
2.1.1.3 Guidance Systems 
ICBMs are guided using either inertial or celestial guidance systems. Inertial 
guidance systems work by calculating an ICBM’s position by use of accelerometers. The 
accelerations measured are integrated with respect to time once to get velocity, and twice 
to get position. Celestial guidance systems calculate an ICBM’s position by referencing 
stationary celestial objects like stars; this system may be used in conjunction with an 
inertial guidance system (Federation of American Scientists, 2000). Both types of guidance 
systems are well suited for missile guidance because they do not need to make contact with 
command and control centers, a communication of which could be scrambled or jammed 
by an enemy. 
2.1.2 Missile Physics 
The physics of a ballistic missile while thrusting in boost phase can be described by 
Tsiolkovsky’s rocket equation, which provides the change in the missile’s velocity (  ) as a 
function of the exhaust velocity (  ) of the fuel and the initial and final masses (   and  , 
respectively) of the rocket for the period in question, as shown in Eq. (2.1.a). 
        (
  
  
) (2.1.a) 
Eq. (2.1.a) can be iterated multiple times to handle missiles with multiple stages. 
The exhaust velocity is directly related to the specific impulse (   ) and acceleration due to 
Earth’s gravity at the surface (  ), and can be used alongside the mass flow rate (
  
  
) to 
solve for the thrust ( ) of the rocket, as shown in Eq. (2.1.b). 
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) (2.1.b) 
Thrust force, when combined with the flight path angle ( ) which, measured from 
the horizontal, defines the direction of thrust, is used to find the velocities along the path of 
the rocket (
   
  
 and 
   
  
, where   is the ground range and   is perpendicular to the earth’s 
surface) as shown in Eq. (2.1.c) and Eq. (2.1.d). 
   
  
 
 
    
       (2.1.c) 
   
  
 
 
    
          (2.1.d) 
These velocities are then integrated to give the position of the rocket as a function of 
time, assuming no outside forces. Here,     is the mass of the rocket, which decreases 
over time due to the exhaustion of fuel. 
2.2 Ballistic Missile Defense History 
Progressions in the science of offensive ballistic missiles have not brought about 
comparable advances in its counter technology. Despite sixty years of effort since the 
advent of ballistic missiles, a full-scale BMD system has yet to be deployed by any nation. 
Technological, as well as political, forces have worked against the proponents of such 
systems and have placed the relevance of BMD itself under a high level of scrutiny. Yet 
today, in spite of the critics, research into effective and reasonably feasible BMD systems 
continues at a rapid pace. 
2.2.1 The Beginnings: 1940’s - 1970’s 
The first and largest ballistic missile campaign yet witnessed began in September of 
1944 with Nazi Germany’s V-2 ballistic missiles. Unlike the earlier V-1 flying bombs, the 
German V-2s, like all modern ballistic missiles, were capable of achieving supersonic 
speeds and thus were extremely difficult to defend against. In an attempt to counter the V-
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2s, Britain, whom Germany had launched over one-thousand V-2 missiles against, 
attempted to exercise their air superiority in August of 1943 through a variety of 
preemptive air strikes against German missile facilities. 
 
Figure 2.2.a: German V-2 Missile Launching at Peenemünde in 1943 
Nazi Germany’s experimental missile facility at Peenemünde was the site of testing for the V-2 ballistic missile. 
(Deutsches Bundesarchiv) 
The strikes by the Royal Air Force, however, were ineffective against the Nazi 
missile efforts. The so-called “V-Weapons Campaign,” despite consuming nine percent of 
Allied bomb tonnage over thirteen months between the fall of 1943 and the summer of 
1944, was only able to delay the V-1 missiles by a handful of months while the V-2s were 
undeterred. Allied bombings of facilities, such as the experimental missile facility at 
Peenemünde (seen above in Figure 2.2.a), alerted Germany that a dispersion of their efforts 
was needed. Furthermore, despite their clear air dominance, the Allied forces never found a 
single German V-2 launch unit. The launch units, which were mobile, proved to be elusive 
despite being forty-six feet in length and weighing approximately 27,000 pounds. (Werrell, 
2000) 
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During the months following the V-Weapons Campaign, analysis was performed by 
a team of British investigators regarding the use of a conventional artillery barrage against 
incoming German V-1 missiles. It had been determined that if given sufficient warning via a 
radar installation, it would be possible to shoot down a single V-1 missile by firing 320,000 
shells into the air. This solution, apart from being prohibitively expensive, was also 
potentially counterproductive given estimations that two percent of the shells would not 
detonate as planned and the incoming rain of metal would cause more casualties than the 
incoming missile itself. Furthermore, when this analysis was applied to V-2s, it was found 
to be effective only three to ten percent of the time. Thus, given the technology available at 
the time, downing a ballistic missile after launch was essentially impossible. (Werrell, 
2000) 
Following WWII, the effectiveness of Germany’s V-2 ballistic missile campaign 
caused both the United States Army and United States Army Air Forces (AAF) to develop an 
interest in both offensive and defensive ballistic missiles. As a result of this interest, a 
number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems such as THUMPER, WIZARD, and PLATO 
were investigated. Ultimately, the United States Army developed a number of surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs) for terminal defense, while the AAF, then United States Air Force (USAF), 
was to develop a long-range sensing system capable of alerting the terminal defenses. 
In 1957, the Army had a plan for a full-scale defense system using the USAF’s 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning system (BMEWS) and NIKE technology. This plan, however, 
was met with early criticisms which have to this day remained relevant in the BMD debate. 
Opponents doubted that an ABM system could sort out various warheads from decoys as 
well as whether defense against a “saturation” attack would be possible. Furthermore, the 
testing of such systems could only be carried out in separate components thus leaving 
doubt as to whether the system could be relied upon. On ABM, President Kennedy’s 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, said it to be “neither technically feasible nor cost 
effective.” Two technological advancements sought to change the impracticality of ABM 
systems, however, by increasing the ability of radar to detect ICBMs as well as furthering 
the abilities of long range interceptor missiles. Phased-array radar in addition to the NIKE X 
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program, which built upon the previous NIKE project, helped to propel the development of 
America’s first ABM system which would be built in Grand Forks North Dakota. (Werrell, 
2000) 
Concurrent to the developments in ABM technology, the ideology of mutually 
assured destruction (MAD) formed the concept of deterrence. The principle of MAD was 
based on the assumption that if given two nations, each nation would have the ability not 
only to destroy the other via a nuclear attack but to retaliate with equal or greater force in 
the event of such destruction. The idea of possessing the ability of massive retaliation was 
known as “second strike” capability. MAD, a form of psychological deterrence was favored 
to costly ABM systems when dealing with countries such as Russia. As noted by Secretary 
McNamara in a 1967 speech, defense against a Soviet ICBM attack would be not only 
expensive but futile as well (Werrell, 2000). Yet, while defense against Russia was futile, 
defense against China was not. China had only recently developed its own nuclear 
capabilities in the 1960’s and thus had not yet achieved second strike capability. Hence 
China was not bound by the principles of MAD. Today, a similar situation is faced when 
dealing with emerging small nuclear powers such as Iran and North Korea. 
The conclusion of the 1960’s saw the conflict between the interests of the MAD 
ideology and ABM supporters. MAD called for no ABM installments, lest they incite an 
offensive and defensive arms race, or trigger a pre-emptive strike before an opponent's 
ABM system goes online. The result was a record 29 day Senate debate concerning the 
future of the Army’s proposed ABM system which concluded on August 6, 1969 in an 
evenly split vote. Vice President Spiro Agnew cast the deciding vote in favor of preserving 
support for ABM systems. However in May of 1972, the US and Soviets signed the SALT 
(Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and ABM treaties, agreements over not only the number 
of permissible strategic weapons, but also, and more importantly, the maximum number of 
ABM sites. (Werrell, 2000) 
The ABM treaty, following an additional protocol signed in 1974, permitted one 
ABM site within 150 kilometer of either an ICBM field or the national capital. Each site was 
limited to a strict maximum number of missiles, launchers, and radars. Additionally, the 
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treaty prohibited a variety of activities such as developing, testing, and deploying systems 
based in the air, sea, or space. (Werrell, 2000) 
While the ABM and SALT talks were proceeding, the United States was debating the 
continuation of its first ABM system. The system, called Safeguard, was a compromise of 
the Army’s earlier Sentinel program and employed NIKE X technology. The first phase of 
construction was approved in 1969 by one vote in the Senate and construction work 
commenced (Federation of American Scientists, 1998). While opinions varied wildly on the 
utility of the system against ballistic threats, the system gained support under the guise of 
arms control. By the early 1970’s “the strongest and most pressing rationale for Safeguard 
had become its role as a bargaining chip with the Soviets” (Papp, 1987-88). The heated 
debates over the Safeguard continued beyond the signing of the ABM treaty into 1975. 
In compliance with the ABM treaty, the Safeguard system was installed to protect 
the ICBM field near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota (Papp, 1987-88). Deemed 
operational in October 1, 1975, the system worked by detonating nuclear warheads in the 
atmosphere at incoming ICBMs (Federation of American Scientists, 1998). Operational 
status was short-lived, however, lasting less than a year as it proved too expensive. The 
high expense of ABM was reflected in financial policy as ABM expenses fell from an average 
of $1 billion per year in 1960 to $100 million per year by 1980. Following the deactivation 
of the Grand Forks installation in early 1976, ABM systems would receive little attention 
until 1983. (Werrell, 2000) 
2.2.2 The Strategic Defense Initiative: 1980 - 1990 
When President Reagan was elected, the state of BMD technology was primarily 
focused on the defense of United States ICBM launch sites. However, in a landmark speech 
in March of 1983, President Ronald Reagan unveiled the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 
program. SDI represented a departure from the accepted line of MAD defense policy as it 
attempted to leverage America’s industrial strengths against the technical obstacles of 
missile defense. (Werrell, 2000) 
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Ridiculed as “Star Wars”, the SDI was opposed by the Air Force, and Navy as well as 
the arms control community, mainstream media, and academia. Over 7,000 scientists 
opposed the program while the American Physics Society (APS) famously concluded in a 
1987 study that not only were the goals of the SDI impossible using current technology, it 
would take a decade of research to ascertain if it would ever be possible (American 
Physical Society, 1987). 
In spite of harrowing predictions, SDI did not unravel the ABM treaty, or result in a 
global nuclear conflict or even an operational BMD system. The SDI did, however, renew 
strategic arms negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. During a 1985 
meeting in Geneva between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., the two superpowers agreed to reduce 
their strategic arms by fifty percent. (Werrell, 2000) 
2.2.3 National Missile Defense: 1990 - Present 
During President George H. W. Bush's administration, the comprehensive approach 
of SDI was scaled down after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. SDI's original goal of defending 
against a massive nuclear strike was considered out of scope and SDI was refocused to deal 
with engaging a limited ballistic attack. The Clinton administration supported BMD, but 
renamed SDI’s parent organization, known as the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) and funding was reduced. President 
George W. Bush's administration further renamed the program two more times, from 
BMDO to National Missile Defense, and then again to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. 
Additionally, President George W. Bush formally withdrew the U.S. from the ABM treaty 
signed with Russia in 1972. (U.S. Department of Defense) 
2.3 Explored Technologies 
Under the various past BMD programs a number of different technologies were 
explored. In general, these technologies can be separated into categories of nuclear, kinetic, 
and directed energy. The following sections provide an overview of several projects that 
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were built on each of these technologies, outline their benefits, and identify their respective 
shortcomings. 
2.3.1 Nuclear Technologies 
Nuclear warheads were the initial technology of missile defense. The Army’s NIKE 
project, which began as an advanced antiaircraft system, evolved throughout the 1950’s 
with the development of the NIKE-AJAX, NIKE-HERCULES, and finally the NIKE-ZEUS. This 
final iteration was authorized by the Army in 1958 as a full-scale BMD development 
program (Papp, 1987-88). NIKE-ZEUS interceptor missiles were equipped with atomic-
tipped warheads and were provided long-range sensing capabilities by the Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System (BMEWS), a project of the Air Force (Werrell, 2000). The system’s 
method of action was to bring the incoming threat during mid-course flight within the 
lethal range of the interceptor missile and detonate its payload. 
Although the replacement of the conventional warhead on the original AJAX missile 
with the atomic technology of the ZEUS missile increased its lethality from tens to 
hundreds of feet, several drawbacks inherent to the use of nuclear warheads on 
interceptors persisted. The detonation of a nuclear warhead in the atmosphere would blind 
the BMEWS, thus preventing the detection of additional threats. Furthermore, due to 
limitations on the effective range of the BMEWS systems and additional overhead 
introduced in command commit times, nuclear fallout over friendly territories was a real 
possibility. 
Nevertheless, nuclear technologies were the first BMD methods to see deployment. 
The efforts of the NIKE-ZEUS project would eventually become NIKE-X, which, after a 
decade of debate, would see deployment as the Safeguard system. In its final form, the 
Safeguard employed two kinds of missiles, the Spartan and the Sprint, which were 
responsible for mid-course and terminal defense respectively (Papp, 1987-88). While the 
Spartan was capable of intercepts at ranges of about 556 kilometers and altitudes of 185 
kilometers, the Sprint was a high-acceleration missile capable of intercepts between 1.5 
kilometers and 30 kilometers within a range of 185 kilometers. 
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2.3.2 Kinetic Technologies 
Atomic-tipped interceptors gradually were phased out in favor of kinetic solutions. 
Beginning the in 1980’s, the Army studied the feasibility of destroying an incoming ballistic 
threat by merely colliding with it. A result of this study was the Homing Overlay 
Experiment (HOE). The HOE featured a new, non-explosive payload (see below in Figure 
2.3.a). Kinetic based interceptor technology was affirmed in June of 1984 when a missile 
outfitted with the HOE successfully intercepted a Minuteman ICBM. The intercept took 
place with the ICBM traveling at more than 15,000 mph at an altitude of over 100 miles 
(Werrell, 2000). 
 
Figure 2.3.a: Homing Overlay Experiment Expanding Warhead 
The Homing Overlay Experiment was an early form of kinetic BMD which used a unique expanding warhead. 
Once exospheric, the interceptor missile would expand its warhead, thus increasing its physical footprint, and 
reducing the proximity required to hit a target. (SMDC) 
2.3.3 Directed Energy Technologies 
A third type of missile defense technology whose effectiveness has only recently 
been shown is directed energy. Once a primary focus of the SDI, directed energy required 
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technology beyond the state of the art in the 1980’s. Today, however, directed energy has 
been shown to be effective against ballistic threats, such as in the proof of concept Airborne 
Laser project. 
The Airborne Laser (ABL), developed by Boeing, is a directed energy weapon (DEW) 
that hoped to fill the role of boost phase interception (Defense Science Board, 2007). This 
defense system involved a modified Boeing 747 aircraft which housed a chemical oxygen 
iodine laser (COIL). This laser’s method of action involved focusing on a target long enough 
to reduce the structural integrity of a missile’s skin thus impairing the ability of the target 
to withstand the stress of high-speed flight through the atmosphere (Barton, et al., 2004). 
On February 11, 2010, the ABL successfully engaged and destroyed a test ballistic threat 
while in boost (Selinger, 2010). Despite having a relatively low cost per intercept (the cost 
of firing the COIL), the system’s range of several hundred kilometers dictated having 
multiple aircraft continuously in flight in order to achieve coverage of more than a localized 
theater (Alexander & Wolf, 2010). Given that the Airborne Laser was conceived in the early 
1980’s and was originally scheduled to demonstrate a lethal intercept in 2003, the 
technological, engineering, and testing phases of development of even a fully supported 
DEW system can clearly be quite long. Furthermore, despite the successful firing of the ABL 
system, Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz was quoted on February 23, 2010 
as stating that while the ABL is “a magnificent technical achievement … [it]does not reflect 
something that is operationally viable” (Hoffman, 2010). 
Although the successful firing of the ABL represents the first time a ballistic missile 
has ever been destroyed (on purpose) while in its boost phase, lasers have their own 
drawbacks (Selinger, 2010). A simple ablative coating for example, such as cork, can 
provide several seconds of protection. Additionally, if the missile were to rotate, the laser 
may not be able to focus on one spot long enough to burn a hole through it quickly, thus 
providing additional protection to the missile. With a potentially long focus time, the laser 
might not be able to sustain its power long enough to cause meaningful structural damage 
to the ICBM. 
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Additional directed energy weapons such as charged and neutral particle beams 
have also been considered at length as demonstrated by the findings of the 1987 APS 
report entitled The Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons (American Physical 
Society, 1987). These technologies continue to prove elusive due to their highly technical 
nature, high cost, and large power requirements. 
2.3.4 State of the Art 
Despite many studies on BMD systems, kinetic kill vehicles have today remained the 
top choice for defense. The current national missile defense (NMD) system used by the 
United States consists of several components. Ground-based interceptor missiles are 
stationed strategically to protect the United States from so-called rogue-states such as 
North Korea, and advanced radar systems are used to track the incoming threats. This 
system, known as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), currently has installments 
in both Alaska and California (Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, 2009). Between 
October 2, 1999 and May 25, 2007, twelve hit-to-kill tests of the GMD were executed. Of 
these, only six (50%) have been successes (Samson & Black, 2007).  
Additionally, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System complements the GMD by 
providing sea-based mid-course defense and target tracking capabilities. Although the 
system is capable of engaging only short to medium range ballistic threats, it has the 
capability of passing target information to the GMD (O'Rourke, 2010). Furthermore, the 
system will, as indicated by current progress, eventually be capable of intercepting all 
ballistic threats in midcourse. The current and future versions of the Aegis BMD system, 
labeled according to their PAA (Phased Adaptive Approach) phase, can be seen below in 
Table 2.3.a. The current version of the Aegis BMD system (PAA Phase I - 3.6.1) is capable of 
handling only short to medium range ballistic threats with a limited capability for inter-
mediate range. Looking forward, however, reveals plans to add limited capability for 
ICBM’s as well. (O'Rourke, 2010) 
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Aegis System Information PAA Phase I  PAA Phase II  PAA Phase III 
Version of Aegis BMD System 3.6.1  4.0.1 5.0  5.1 5.2 
Certified for initial use 2006  2012 2014  2016 2018 
OTE assessment 2008  2014 2016  2018 2020 
Mid-course interceptor(s) used 
SM-3 Blk IA ∎  ∎ ∎  ∎ ∎ 
SM-3 Blk IB   ∎ ∎  ∎ ∎ 
SM-3 Blk IIA      ∎ ∎ 
Terminal phase interceptor(s) used 
SM-2 Blk IV ∎       
Eventual new missile       ∎ 
LRS&T capability Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Types of ballistic missiles that can be engaged 
SRBM Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
MRBM Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IRBM Limited  Limited Limited  Enhanced Enhanced 
ICBM No  No No  Limited Limited 
Launch on remote capability Initial  Enhanced Yes  Yes Yes 
Engage on remote capability No  No No  Yes Yes 
Notes: OTE is operational test and evaluation. LRS&T is long-range search and track - the ability to detect 
and track ballistic missiles. SRBM is short-range ballistic missile; MRBM is medium-range ballistic missile; 
IRBM is intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM is intercontinental ballistic missile. Launch on remote is 
the ability to launch the interceptor using data from off-board sensors. Engage on remote is the ability to 
engage targets using data from off-board sensors. 
Table 2.3.a: Current and Future Aegis BMD System Version 
Future plans for the naval-based Aegis BMD system reveal intent to expand from handling only short to medium 
range ballistic missiles to intermediate and intercontinental ranges as well. (O'Rourke, 2010) 
Shown here, the Aegis BMD system is slated to support ICBMs in a limited capacity 
beginning in 2018 with version 5.1 of PAA Phase III. 
2.4 High-Powered Microwaves 
Electromagnetic waves with frequencies between         and         are broadly 
classified as microwaves. This frequency band corresponds to wavelengths of one meter 
and one millimeter respectively (Pozar, 1993). As stated in Section 1.1, investigations into 
HPM systems must incorporate all of the distinct phases through which the propagating 
39 
 
wave travels and make note of how each event drives the output and is constrained by the 
input. The following sections detail the power sources, antenna considerations, 
propagation effects, penetrability, coupling, and responses of high-powered microwaves. 
2.4.1 Microwave Power Levels 
The propagation of a high-power microwave begins with its source power (     ). 
Current HPM technology has enabled systems to direct up to ten gigawatts of power 
without the need for stationary electrical generators (Fulghum, 2007). Furthermore, 
several innovative concepts are being investigated which promise to boost the power of 
HPM systems further. As stated in a 2007 report on military grade HPM systems: 
Researchers predict leaps of 10-100 times in power output within two years. That 
advance could push the beam-weapon technology far beyond the 1-10-gigawatt limit of 
current tactical-size HPM devices. Long-standing industry estimates are that it would 
require a 100-gigawatt pulse for a few nanoseconds to disable a cruise missile at a 
useful range. (Fulghum, 2007) 
Although verifying the accuracy of this prediction is impossible due to the classified nature 
of the work, it is possible to use the range suggested as a basis for the analysis detailed in 
this report. Increasing the current limit of ten gigawatts by a factor of 10-100 would result 
in power levels of        to         . Taking the lower end of this range (      ) as 
the maximum power level which can be achieved today (           ), a power level 
which may be said to be reasonable (  ) can then be defined as half of the maximum 
(        ⁄       ). This defines a somewhat conservative range of       to        
as the power levels which can be achieved today. This range is shown below on a 
logarithmic scale along with other notable values for the purpose of placing this range in 
context. 
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Figure 2.4.a: HPM Power Range on Logarithmic Scale 
The range of reasonable power levels considered for an HPM system,      to      , are shown here on a 
logarithmic scale. 
Note, that the aforementioned 2007 report claimed HPM systems to pulse “for a few 
nanoseconds” in order to be effective. Given that energy, for constant power, may be 
defined as seen in Eq. (2.4.a), it is possible to quantify the energy required by an HPM 
system. 
     (2.4.a) 
Assuming constant power levels and a conservative pulse duration of      , the 
operation of an HPM at       and        corresponds to energies of         and         
respectively. Again, this range can be shown on a logarithmic scale as is done below in 
Figure 2.4.b. 
 
Figure 2.4.b: HPM Energy Range on Logarithmic Scale 
If constant power and a pulse duration of       are assumed, then power levels of      and       
correspond to         and         respectively. 
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Given source power and energy, the considerations made when a microwave is 
emitted from an antenna must next be discussed. 
2.4.2 Antenna Considerations 
In order to focus the microwave beam, a metallic parabolic antenna is a strong 
option. The level to which the beam can be focused by such an antenna is defined by the 
Rayleigh Criterion. This criterion gives the angular spread of the generated beam (  ) as a 
function of the radiation’s wavelength (     ) and the antenna’s diameter (     ), as 
shown in Eq.(2.4.b) (Nave). 
        
      
 
 (2.4.b) 
Eq. (2.4.b) shows that a wider antenna corresponds to a smaller dispersion rate.  
Wide antennae are difficult to build, however, and can become quite expensive at larger 
widths. 
The Rayleigh Criterion allows for the width of a beam (     ) at a distance 
(     ) away from the beam source to be calculated, as shown in Eq. (2.4.c). 
           
      
 
   (2.4.c) 
As defined, the width of the beam ( ) is related positively to the distance it travels 
and inversely to the diameter of the antenna used. Thus, as a beam propagates, it naturally 
diverges, causing the intensity delivered at distances much greater than the antenna 
diameter (   ) to be significantly diminished. This observation has far-reaching 
implications for HPM systems as will be shown in later sections. 
Because we are considering the propagation of electromagnetic waves, which are 
typically defined by their frequency rather than their wavelength, a substitution can be 
made. 
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 (2.4.d) 
Replacing the wavelength ( ) from Eq. (2.4.c) with the speed of light (      ⁄ ) over 
the frequency (      ) is shown in Eq. (2.4.d).This convention will be used throughout the 
report for consistency of variables. 
Once emitted from an antenna, the electromagnetic wave will begin to propagate. If 
the system is based within the Earth’s atmosphere, the wave will be attenuated by the 
atmosphere. 
2.4.3 Atmospheric Propagation Effects 
The atmosphere, in general, attenuates frequencies in the microwave range less 
than those in other frequency bands. Because of this phenomenon, they are of particular 
interest for applications requiring long range electromagnetic propagation. For frequencies 
above        , the atmosphere is effectively opaque, meaning that the atmosphere 
absorbs a considerable amount of electromagnetic radiation (Crawford, Jordan, Kendall, 
Powers, & Varni, 1996). Although there are generally small levels of atmospheric 
attenuation in the microwave region of the electromagnetic spectrum, certain frequencies 
are attenuated more heavily due to dry air, water vapor, clouds, and rain. Atmospheric 
“windows” describe the frequencies in which the effects of atmospheric attenuation are 
minimal. Figure 2.4.c below shows these windows in graphic form. 
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Figure 2.4.c: Atmospheric Attenuation as a Function of Frequency 
Due to the makeup of the Earth’s atmosphere, the attenuation of electromagnetic waves at different frequencies 
varies nonlinearly. (Lesurf) 
The attenuations levels in       as shown in Figure 2.4.c, for a temperature of 
      and one atmosphere of pressure at sea level, clearly demonstrate the windows 
created between peaks of attenuation attributed to the water and oxygen content of the 
atmosphere. Additionally, the opacity of the atmosphere is shown for frequencies greater 
than         where attenuations in excess of       ⁄  are reached. Note that 
at       ⁄ , the power of an electromagnetic beam is reduced by an order of magnitude 
for each kilometer traveled. 
Additionally, the attenuation is a function of the altitude. As the altitude is increased, 
the observed attenuation decreases. This relationship is demonstrated by Figure 2.4.d 
below which depicts atmospheric attenuation rates for nominal altitudes. 
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Figure 2.4.d: Atmospheric Attenuation Rates for Nominal Altitudes 
As altitude is increased, the rate of signal loss decreases. At      , the atmospheric attenuation at a frequency of 
      is two orders of magnitude less than it is at sea level. (Kopp, 2000) 
As seen in Figure 2.4.d above, attenuation rates for frequencies between        
and       , and again at         are significant. The former attenuation range coincides 
with the resonant frequencies of oxygen molecules and is called the        complex 
(Shambayati, 2008). Frequencies outside these ranges are qualified as windows. In these 
windows, atmospheric attenuation rates drop off as a function of altitude. 
To determine the range of an HPM system, attenuation due to the atmosphere must 
be considered. Given an initial location, pressure, temperature, and firing angle of a 
ground-based beam, an atmospheric attenuation model can be used to estimate the 
decibels of power loss encountered. To form an atmospheric model, attenuation due to the 
atmosphere can be broken into four independent components: attenuation due to dry air 
(        ), water vapor (      ), rain (     ), and clouds (      ). Since the effects of these 
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components are independent of each other, their individual attenuations may be summed 
(Shambayati, 2008) to find the total attenuation due to the atmosphere (             ⁄ ). 
To reiterate, as seen above Figure 2.4.d, atmospheric attenuation is a function of altitude. 
To account for this relationship in an atmospheric model, each of the aforementioned 
components, and thus the sum as a whole, can be modeled as a function of the altitude 
(       ) above sea level. The total attenuation of the atmosphere (      ) is thus described 
by Eq. (2.4.e). 
                                                   (2.4.e) 
As the creation of a complete atmospheric model was beyond the scope of this 
project, a combination of existing models was used. Seen in Eqs. (2.4.f) and (2.4.j) from 
(Zhang, 1997), both             and           can be modeled as functions of altitude 
(       ) for a given frequency (        ). Furthermore, they both incorporate models for 
pressure (           ) and the temperature (         ) as functions of altitude. 
Additionally,        incorporates water vapor density (          
 ⁄ ) as a function of 
altitude as well. 
It is important to note that these models, along with the other models presented in 
this section, are curve-fits that closely approximate measured values for atmospheric 
attenuation levels. Furthermore, note that while Eq. (2.4.f) ignores attenuation values 
between frequencies of        and       , this range is within the        complex and 
therefore would not be considered for a ground-based HPM system. Thus, such an omission 
is acceptable within the scope of this project.
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Attenuation due to dry air can be modeled as: 
            ,
                                                           
                                             
 (2.4.f) 
Where         ,           and           are given by: 
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+ (2.4.g) 
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+ (2.4.h) 
           
      
      
       (2.4.i) 
Attenuation due to water vapor can be modeled as: 
          [             ]           (2.4.j) 
Where                and          are given by: 
              
               
  
         
 
     
              
    
                           
 (2.4.k) 
       
          
                            
 
         
                             
 (2.4.l) 
          
                 
   (2.4.m) 
Where       
    
    
 and       
   
     
. (Zhang, 1997)
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NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Deep Space Network’s surface weather model is 
used to model temperature as a function of height (     ), as is shown in Eq. (2.4.n). The 
function       , referenced in Eq. (2.4.n), refers to the U.S. Standard Atmosphere model 
and is shown in Eq. (2.4.o). 
      {
    
    
 
(             )                   
                                                                           
                                                                                   
 (2.4.n) 
       {
                                            
                                            
                                                        
 (2.4.o) 
(Shambayati, 2008) 
NASA’s model also models pressure as a function of height (    ). Shown in Eq. 
(2.4.p),     is the pressure measured at an altitude of   . 
          
(
           
                               
)
 (2.4.p) 
(Shambayati, 2008) 
Seen in Eqs. (2.4.q) through (2.4.s) from (Shambayati, 2008),          is modeled as 
a function of altitude (       ) for a given frequency (        ). Furthermore, the model 
incorporates a model for the rainfall rate (            ⁄ ) as a function altitude. 
                     
         (2.4.q) 
         {
                                                      
                                         
                                       
 (2.4.r) 
          {
                                                
                                    
                                    
 (2.4.s) 
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(Shambayati, 2008) 
Finally, as shown in Eq. (2.4.t) from (Shambayati, 2008),        is modeled as a 
function of altitude (       ) for a given frequency (        ). Furthermore, it 
incorporates a model for the liquid water content profile of the atmosphere 
(              ⁄ ) and the temperature (         ) as functions of altitude. 
                   
                          (2.4.t) 
(Shambayati, 2008) 
Given initial conditions for all variables in this section, a function for the total 
atmospheric attenuation as a function of height,           as described in Eq. (2.4.e), can be 
found. Most of these conditions, while numerous, can be calculated or measured at the time 
of interest. This total attenuation is used to calculate the loss in signal power as a beam 
travels through the atmosphere. However, once the electromagnetic beam has propagated 
to its target, the beam must also penetrate the target’s shielding. 
2.4.4 Target Penetration 
Faraday cages present an effective defense to an HPM weapon as they prevent 
electromagnetic waves from entering the inside of the cage. A perfect faraday cage is made 
by completely enclosing a volume inside of an ideal conductor. Implementing a perfect 
faraday cage on an ICBM is not possible due to the complex nature of the weapon. A report 
published in 1973, which specifically looked at the effects of electromagnetic radiation on 
an early ballistic missile, asserts that a maximum level of shielding exists: 
In a large weapon system, total shielding for levels above       are very difficult to 
attain because of the numerous interfaces and different materials used in the shielding 
structure. (Cox, 1973) 
The various stages of an ICBM must interface with each other to operate properly. Due to 
these stages, there exist discontinuities in surface planes and materials which would act as 
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windows to damaging electromagnetic radiation. Thus,       is used as a baseline value for 
the electromagnetic shielding that an HPM system must overcome to be effective. Once the 
shielding of a target is penetrated, the energy carried in the wave must be coupled to a 
target. 
2.4.5 Physics of Microwave-Target Coupling 
Since microwaves are defined at a frequency range which is several orders of 
magnitude lower than lasers, they carry a significantly smaller amount of energy. As such, 
microwaves are unsuitable for the melting or vaporization of a target through the transfer 
of energy. Instead, microwaves are more suited to the goal of a soft kill, in this case the 
disruption of the guidance systems of an intercontinental ballistic missile. 
The ability of a microwave system to achieve a soft kill is dependent on the 
particular vulnerabilities of the target. Any part of the missile that is entirely encased in a 
metallic surface is well-protected from microwave radiation, since microwaves are 
reflected by such surfaces. However, “due to their long wavelength, microwaves are 
strongly diffracted as they pass through small apertures and can irradiate areas which 
would seem to be well shielded by the target’s external surface” (Nielsen, 1994). These 
small apertures present opportunities for the microwaves to enter the target and damage 
the target’s circuits. 
If any part of the target’s systems contains microwave receivers, the target may 
have a high vulnerability to HPM systems. If the HPM system operates at the same 
frequency as the target’s receivers, the HPM system could send radiation that reaches the 
target at too great an intensity for the target to handle. If the signals received have a 
sufficiently high intensity, currents will be induced which can heat and, ideally, burn out 
wires and other elements in the target’s circuitry. The amount of power, and therefore 
energy, dissipated within a wire is related to the square of current. As such, a great enough 
induced current can deposit more energy and heat into the wire than the target’s heat sinks 
and cooling systems can handle, causing the wire to melt. This type of damage requires 
intensities of only      to        ⁄  on target. (Nielsen, 1994) 
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If a microwave receiver does not exist within the target, an HPM system can deliver 
a kill through the deposition of raw power into the target’s circuits. Sensitive electronic 
components can absorb enough energy from microwave radiation to burn out. Even 
without a microwave receiver, microwave radiation can still induce currents, since the 
radiation is a time-dependent electromagnetic field. Additionally, if a microwave system 
were able to ignite plasmas at the surface of the target, a higher amount of radiation could 
be coupled to the target. However, the intensity threshold for such a reaction to occur is in 
the range of     to       ⁄ . (Nielsen, 1994) 
Additionally, a study performed by the United States Air Force states that circuit 
disruption requires intensity levels of      to       ⁄  for commercial devices 
(Crawford, Jordan, Kendall, Powers, & Varni, 1996). 
The three ranges identified in this section to effective couple electromagnetic 
radiation to a target are identified in Figure 2.4.e on a logarithmic scale. 
 
Figure 2.4.e: HPM Intensity Range on Logarithmic Scale 
The three ranges of intensities found to effectively couple electromagnetic radiation to a target are shown on a 
logarithmic scale spanning eleven orders of magnitude. 
Clearly a large range of intensities can be considered. Once an electromagnetic wave 
has delivered some level of intensity onto a target, the target can respond in a number of 
ways. 
2.4.6 Target Response 
Microwave beams have empirically demonstrated an ability to disrupt or destroy 
circuitry. Eureka Aerospace has created a system that remotely disables cars by using 
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microwave beams to disrupt or destroy the engine control unit circuitry. The system’s 
power specifications were detailed in a recent report: 
The device's peak power output is two gigawatts, although the average power emitted 
in a single shot is about 100 watts. Each radiated pulse lasts about 50 nanoseconds. All 
the test cars' engines were shut off using a single pulse at a distance of approximately 
15 meters, making the total energy output 100 joules… (Sauser, 2007) 
A report to congress in 2008 also detailed the ability for HPM weapons to destroy 
electronics, "An HPM weapon has a shorter possible range than HEMP, but it can induce 
currents large enough to melt circuitry..." (Wilson, 2008). The report goes on to state that 
in addition to short-order effects, such as the physical destruction of circuitry long-order 
effects can also occur. For example, U.S. Comanche helicopter was responsible for a two-
week disruption of global positioning systems after running a radar test involving HPM 
weapons in Albany, New York. 
The specific response witnessed by a given target is a function of the target itself, 
the power levels involved, the frequency, and the underlying physics of such interactions. 
2.4.7 Definition of Success for Soft Kill 
Since the method of destruction for an HPM system is not a hard kill, such as the 
vaporization of a target, it is not obvious as to what qualifies a success. Unfortunately, there 
is no instant visual feedback to say whether or not the system was effective. However, 
because the missile’s navigational systems have been neutralized, its trajectory is entirely 
subject to atmospheric effects, and is now highly dependent on wind and drag. If an 
intercept is achieved, the missile’s final destination may be so uncertain that the enemy 
decides not to arm the payload. Small uncertainties in the initial part of a several thousand 
kilometer path can lead to very high uncertainties in a missile’s end position. As the effects 
of atmosphere are unpredictable, however, it is difficult to quantify the amount by which a 
missile will miss its target. 
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2.5 Platform Realms of Deployment 
Defense platforms can be deployed into a number of different realms such as land, 
sea, air, and space. Each realm has natural considerations which must be made when 
discussing the deployment of defensive platforms. Specifically, this project examines 
ground, which is a combination of land and sea, and space-based realms of deployment for 
HPM systems. 
2.5.1 Ground-Based Platforms 
All currently deployed missile defense systems employ ground-basing and are 
located either on land bases or upon naval vessels. The stationary nature of ground-based 
platforms is in many ways advantageous. The weight and size of such systems is often of 
minimal concern, while the ability to easily apply repairs and upgrades reduces the 
redundancies which must be built in. Furthermore, ground-based systems often have 
access to high quality power sources which are difficult to attain in other realms. 
In addition to these advantages, however, ground-based systems do face a number 
of obstacles. Unlike satellite-based systems, ground-based systems must consider the 
effects of the atmosphere. High-powered microwaves, depending on the operational 
frequency, may be attenuated heavily as they pass through the atmosphere. This effect 
must be compensated for by increasing system parameters such as signal power, antenna 
diameter, or by selecting operating frequencies which fall into the natural attenuation 
windows, which are shown in Figure 2.4.d. 
Another issue for ground-based systems concerns the politics of platform location. 
Being as it is not possible to place these systems inside the country of concern, they must 
be placed as close as possible, potentially residing on foreign, albeit friendly, territory. The 
range of such systems must therefore be capable of reaching from the proximity of the 
threat country’s borders and into its center in order to be capable of guaranteeing 
coverage. 
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2.5.2 Space-Based Platforms 
Space-based platforms address many of the drawbacks of ground-based systems. 
For one, the HPM system operates out of the atmosphere, removing effects of atmospheric 
attenuation. Secondly, political borders do not exist in space, allowing systems to directly 
pass over threat regions. 
As shown in Eq. (2.4.d), the width of HPM’s beam diverges over distance - a natural 
phenomenon which reduces the delivered intensity of the beam. As such, it is beneficial to 
place space-based HPM systems in lower orbits to limit signal power requirements. 
Pursuing this benefit, however, necessitates the use of low Earth orbits (LEOs), as opposed 
to medium Earth orbits (MEOs) or geosynchronous orbits (GEOs). 
2.5.2.1 Earth Orbits 
There are three main altitude bands of geocentric orbits that can be considered for 
missile defense platforms. They are LEOs (low Earth orbits), MEOs (medium Earth orbits), 
and GEOs (geosynchronous orbits) as Figure 2.5.a demonstrates below. 
 
Figure 2.5.a: Various Types of Earth Orbits 
Low Earth, medium Earth, and geosynchronous orbits, some of possible orbits that can be achieved, each 
correspond to a specific altitude band. Distances not to scale. (Federation of American Scientists, 1998) 
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LEOs (low Earth orbits) have the advantage of being relatively close to the target, 
reducing requirements on initial power for HPMs. Although these orbits are defined as 
being from 0-2,000 kilometers in altitude (Vallado, 2007), orbits below 300 kilometers 
have too much atmospheric drag to remain useful for more than a few years (Barton, et al., 
2004). Because of their low altitudes, satellites in LEO have short orbital periods (roughly 
between 90 and 120 minutes) and consequently their coverage zones relative to the Earth 
move quickly as a function of time. This movement necessitates constellations of satellites, 
seen in Figure 2.5.b, to achieve continuous global coverage. 
 
Figure 2.5.b: Low Earth Orbit Satellite Constellation 
Low Earth orbits often make use of satellite constellations in order to achieve reliable coverage. Distances not to 
scale. (Kowoma, 2009) 
As the total cost of a space-based system is related closely to its total mass, the 
addition of satellites to complete a constellation can be prohibitively expensive. Currently, 
placing payloads into LEO costs approximately $3,000-5,000 per kilogram (Space 
Exploration Technologies Corporation, 2010). 
MEOs (medium Earth orbits) can range in altitude from 2,000 to below 35,786 
kilometers with orbital periods ranging from two to just under 24 hours (Vallado, 2007). 
The coverage zone of a satellite in MEO moves as a function of time, though at a reduced 
pace as compared to LEOs. While favorable to applications such as communications, HPM 
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systems do not share in this regard. A MEO necessitates achieving ranges in excess of 2,000 
kilometers, a requirement which is prohibitive. 
Geosynchronous orbit (GEO) corresponds to an orbital altitude of 35,786 
kilometers, giving the satellite an orbital period equal to the earth’s rotational period 
(Vallado, 2007). This period means that the satellite looks down upon roughly the same 
area over time. However, because of the long distance from the target, the accuracy and 
power required for directed energy weapons is again prohibitive. 
Each of the aforementioned orbit types, LEO, MEO, and GEO, correspond to ranges of 
orbital altitudes. Along with orbital altitude, inclination can be considered. Inclination is 
the angle between the plane of Earth's equator and the orbital plane of the satellite. If this 
angle is 90 degrees, the orbit is called a polar orbit. Polar orbits employ the only inclination 
which results in a path of coverage which crosses over every latitude in a single orbital 
period. Consequently, satellites in a polar orbit have the opportunity to cover every part of 
Earth as the Earth rotates underneath them. Thus, polar orbits are preferable when 
attempting to achieve continuous Earth coverage. A constellation of satellites in low polar 
orbit can be seen in Figure 2.5.c below. 
 
Figure 2.5.c: Constellation of Low Earth Polar Orbits 
Satellites in polar orbits can be thought of as orbiting parallel to lines of longitude. Thus, if a constellation of 
satellites in polar orbit is employed, the distance between the various rings of such a constellation would be 
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greatest at the equator of the Earth. Satellites in polar orbit cross over every line of latitude in a single orbital 
period. Distances not to scale. (Clark, Langer, & Powell, 2010) 
Satellites in polar orbits can be thought of as orbiting along lines of longitude. Thus, 
if a constellation of satellites in polar orbit is employed, the distance between the various 
rings of such a constellation would be greatest at the equator of the Earth. 
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3 Methods 
In order to ensure a mission kill, an HPM system must deliver a minimum level of 
power per unit area, i.e. intensity, onto a target (          
 ⁄ ). This quantity places an 
upper bound on a high-powered microwave (HPM) system’s range. Section 3.1 derives the 
maximum vacuum range (    ), where      is the distance a microwave beam can travel in 
free space while delivering a level of intensity greater than or equal to     . 
3.1 Maximum Vacuum Range 
To find the maximum vacuum range (    ), it is first necessary to find the intensity 
delivered at an arbitrary distance. The intensity delivered (        
 ⁄ ) by a microwave 
beam, at a distance (     ), is found by taking the system’s source power (     ) and 
dividing it by the area of the beam at that distance (        ), as is shown in Eq. (3.1.a). 
   (
 
        
) (3.1.a) 
Assuming a circular antenna, Eq. (2.4.d), which employs the Rayleigh Criterion (see 
Section 2.4.2) to calculate the width of the beam (        ) at a distance ( ) from the 
source, is used to define the area of the beam at that distance using the equation for the 
area of a circle with a radius      
    
 
, as is shown in Eq. (3.1.b). 
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 (3.1.b) 
Substituting Eq. (2.4.d), for the width of the beam ( ), then gives the circular area of 
the beam in terms of the distance ( ), the speed of light (      ⁄ ), the antenna diameter 
(     ), and the operating frequency of the beam (      ), as is seen in Eq. (3.1.c). 
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 (3.1.c) 
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Finally, substituting the beam area (        ) into Eq. (3.1.a) gives the delivered 
intensity, as shown in (3.1.d). 
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)
  
   
 
 (
   
        
)
 
 (3.1.d) 
Next, the electromagnetic shielding of the target must be considered. The 
electromagnetic shielding (        ) of a given target is measured in decibels of loss and is 
thus computed using a ratio of the system’s source power ( ) to the power which 
penetrates a missile’s shielding (                ), as shown in (3.1.e). 
           (
 
            
) (3.1.e) 
To find the intensity delivered onto a target (         
 ) at   meters from the 
source after penetrating through    decibels of shielding, the delivered intensity, defined 
above in Eq. (3.1.d) as   , is multiplied by the inverse of the logarithmic power ratio. This 
relationship is shown below in Eq. (3.1.f). 
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) (3.1.f) 
Using the properties of logarithms, one can extract the inverse of the power ratio 
from the electromagnetic shielding level (  ), as shown in Eq. (3.1.g) through Eq. (3.1.j). 
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) (3.1.i) 
59 
 
            
 
   (
   
  ) (3.1.j) 
Thus, an equation for the intensity delivered onto a target (   ) is found by 
substituting the values for    and (
            
 
) into Eq. (3.1.f). 
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 (3.1.l) 
The maximum vacuum range (    ) is defined at the point where the intensity 
delivered onto a target (   ) is equal to minimum required intensity (    ). The maximum 
vacuum range can therefore be found by solving Eq. (3.1.l) for   with     set equal to     , as 
shown in Eq. (3.1.m). 
     
     
       √ 
 √
  (   (
  
  ))
    
 (3.1.m) 
Eq. (3.1.m) above shows that the maximum range (    ) is positively influenced by 
frequency (      ), antenna diameter (     ), and signal power (     ), while being 
negatively influenced by the required intensity (         
 ⁄ ) and the electromagnetic 
shielding of the target (        ). 
3.2 Target Critical Altitude 
An ICBM flying a downrange distance of 5,500 kilometers has a characteristic 
altitude (  ) and time (  ) for when it leaves boost phase.  Additionally, there exists a time 
margin (  ) in which an HPM system must engage an ICBM prior to the completion of 
boost phase in order to induce enough navigational error to qualify for a mission kill.  The 
altitude corresponding to the end of boost time (  ) minus the margin time (  ) is called 
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the critical altitude (  ). The critical altitude describes the greatest height that an ICBM 
travelling 5,500 kilometers can be hit during the boost phase while still providing a great 
enough margin to induce a mission killing error. 
 
Figure 3.2.a: Critical Altitude Explained 
For an ICBM flying a downrange distance of         , there exists a critical altitude. The critical altitude, seen 
here as a dotted red line, describes the greatest height the ICBM can be hit during the boost phase while still 
inducing a mission killing error. Distances are not to scale. 
ICBMs flying distances greater than 5,500 kilometers have characteristic altitudes 
(   ) and times (   ) that are greater than    and    because these ICBMs must spend a 
greater amount of time in boost phase due to the increased energy requirements of 
travelling longer distances. Consequently, its critical altitude (   ) will be greater as well, 
since    remains constant. Therefore, all ICBMs of a given type are guaranteed to travel 
through    with at least the minimum margin time remaining regardless of downrange 
distance travelled.  Consequently, an HPM system which is capable of targeting an ICBM 
flying a downrange distance of          would be able to successfully intercept ICBMs 
travelling greater downrange distances as well. 
3.3 Ground-Based System Analysis 
A ground-based HPM is defined as any system which is either land or sea-based. 
Discussed in detail below, the proximity of a ground-based system to the surface of the 
Earth raises unique considerations. The fired microwave beam must propagate through the 
atmosphere, encountering attenuation not previously accounted for in the maximum 
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vacuum range. Thus, an atmospheric attenuation model must be used to calculate the 
attenuated range of the beam. Next, the curvature of the Earth must be considered when 
calculating the altitude of the beam above the surface. In this regard, the use of a Cartesian 
coordinate system and a spherical Earth model can greatly simplify the geometry of the 
system. Additionally, the concept of a system’s downrange must be introduced to precisely 
describe the surface area covered by a single installment.  And finally, the effective range of 
a system must be defined.  
As a microwave beam propagates, the atmosphere attenuates the intensity it can 
apply to a target, thus decreasing its range. As shown in Section 2.4.3, atmospheric 
attenuation is modeled as a function of altitude above sea level (       ) for a given 
frequency (        ). Before this model is utilized, however, the geometry of a ground-
based system must first be defined. 
3.3.1 System Geometry 
The Earth is modeled as a sphere with a radius (  ) equal to the Earth’s equatorial 
radius (             ). A two-dimensional cross-section of this spherical Earth model is 
be placed in a Cartesian coordinate system with the topmost point of the Earth’s surface 
residing at the origin (for ground-basing analysis only) and the center of the cross-section 
residing at the point (     ). The position of a single ground-based system deployed at or 
above this topmost point is described solely by its altitude (  ) above the surface, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.3.a below. 
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Figure 3.3.a: Ground-Based Deployed System Geometry 
When modeled as a sphere, a cross-section of the Earth is placed in a Cartesian coordinate system with the 
topmost point of the Earth’s surface residing at the origin. The position of a single ground-based system at or 
above this topmost point is described solely by its altitude (  ) above the surface. 
For a ground-based HPM, if deployed as seen in the geometry of Figure 3.3.a above, 
the microwave beam itself is described by a vector (     ). This vector, extending from the 
deployed system location (    ), is defined at a firing angle (            ), which ranges 
between   and           as measured from the local horizon. The endpoint of the beam 
vector, which is defined as (     ), represents the farthest point at which the minimum 
required intensity (    ) is delivered by the beam. Furthermore, a second vector (     ) is 
drawn normal to the surface of the Earth such that its magnitude represents the minimum 
distance, i.e. altitude, between the surface of the Earth and the point (     ). Finally, the 
distance along the surface of the Earth from the origin to the base of the vector       is 
measured. This distance, henceforth referred to as the downrange distance (   ), 
represents the farthest point on the surface of the Earth which is covered by the beam 
described by the      vector. The geometry of Figure 3.3.a is extended below by Figure 
3.3.b to depict these concepts. 
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Figure 3.3.b: Ground-Based Beam Range Geometry 
For a system deployed at (    ), a microwave beam fired at an angle ( ) is described by the       vector. An 
altitude vector (     ) is drawn normal to the surface of the Earth such that its magnitude represents the altitude 
of (     ). Finally, the downrange distance (   ) of the beam described by the      vector is measured along the 
surface of the Earth from the origin to the base of the       vector. 
The endpoint coordinates (     ) of the vector     , is defined as shown in Eqs. 
(3.3.a) and (3.3.b). 
               (3.3.a) 
                  (3.3.b) 
For the geometry depicted in Figure 3.3.b, it is necessary to derive a means of 
calculating the downrange distance (   ), as well as the magnitude of      , for any 
arbitrary      vector. This calculation is accomplished via linear algebra by introducing 
the vectors  ,   , and    . The vector  , which has a magnitude equal to the 
equatorial radius of the Earth (  ), extends from the point (     ) to the origin. The 
vector   , which has a magnitude equal to the system deployment altitude (  ), extends 
from the origin to the deployed system location. Finally, as seen in Eqs. (3.3.c) and (3.3.d), 
the vector    , which has a magnitude equal to the magnitude of       plus the 
magnitude of  , is the summation of the vectors   and    with      and is placed at 
the deployed system location. 
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‖    ‖                (3.3.c) 
                  (3.3.d) 
The geometry of Figure 3.3.b is extended below in Figure 3.3.c to depict these 
additional vectors. 
 
Figure 3.3.c: Complete Ground-Based Beam Range Geometry 
The vectors  ,   , and     are used to calculate the values of the downrange distance (   ), as well as the 
magnitude of      , for any arbitrary      vector. 
We will begin by deriving an equation for the downrange distance (   ), given an 
arbitrary      vector. Note that, as shown in Figure 3.3.c, the downrange distance is the 
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arc of a circle defined by the angle   and the radius of the Earth (  ). Thus it may be 
calculated as seen in Eq. (3.3.e). 
         (3.3.e) 
The angle   between two vectors   and  is defined as seen in Eq. (3.3.f). Thus, the 
angle   may be found by applying this formula to the vectors   and     and then 
applying the inverse cosine. This calculation is shown below in Eqs. (3.3.f) through (3.3.h). 
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 (3.3.f) 
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(3.3.g) 
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  (3.3.h) 
Thus, the downrange distance may be found by substituting  , as seen in Eq. (3.3.h), 
back into Eq. (3.3.e). 
          
  
(
 
                
√     
    
                  )
  (3.3.i) 
Next, we will look at an equation for the magnitude of      , given an arbitrary 
      vector. As seen in Figure 3.3.c, the magnitude of     is equal to the magnitude of 
      plus the magnitude of  . As shown in Eq. (3.3.j), ‖     ‖ is found by subtracting 
‖  ‖ from ‖    ‖. 
‖     ‖  ‖    ‖  ‖  ‖                (3.3.j) 
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It is next helpful to express     in terms of its components, as is done in Eq. (3.3.k). 
The magnitude of     is found by summing the squares of its components and taking the 
square root. 
                 ̂                      ̂ (3.3.k) 
     √     
                              (3.3.l) 
     √     
                                                 (3.3.m) 
     √     
                                (3.3.n) 
Substituting      into Eq. (3.3.j), gives the magnitude of       in terms of       
and the firing angle ( ). Finally, replacing       with    allows one to create a function for 
     . Seen in Eq. (3.3.p),             is the altitude of a beam after traveling a distance 
(  ) at a firing angle ( ). 
        √     
                                   (3.3.o) 
            √                                  (3.3.p) 
With this geometry defined, we can now calculate atmospheric attenuation. 
3.3.2 Calculating Atmospheric Attenuation 
As seen in Eq. (2.4.e), the total attenuation is defined as a function of altitude 
(                ⁄ ). Thus, to calculate the attenuation of a microwave beam through the 
atmosphere, we can sum the total attenuation at each altitude the beam passes through. To 
find the atmospheric attenuation (        ) encountered by a microwave beam traveling 
an arbitrary distance through the atmosphere, one can evaluate the integral of 
∫       (           )   from   to     , where      represents the length of the beam 
contained within the atmosphere. In other words,      measures the specific distance over 
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which the beam is being attenuated by the atmosphere and is thus unique for each firing 
angle. This unique attenuation is shown below in Eq. (3.3.q), where    is defined as a 
function of both the firing angle   and     . 
           ∫       (           )  
    
 
 (3.3.q) 
To address the calculation of     , it is necessary to introduce two concepts: the 
maximum system range and the atmospheric cutoff altitude. The maximum system range 
(    ) is the farthest a beam fired from an HPM system can propagate while accounting for 
all deployment considerations, such as atmospheric attenuation. The atmospheric cutoff 
altitude is the altitude at which the effects of atmospheric attenuation become negligible. 
The maximum system range is defined using the already defined maximum vacuum 
range. Atmospheric attenuation, like the electromagnetic shielding of a target, is measured 
in decibels of loss. Thus, if    is to represent the decibels of shielding encountered by a 
beam, it may be combined with the shielding (  ) to form an equation for the maximum 
system range in Eq. (3.3.r). 
     
     
       √ 
 √
  (   (
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(3.3.r) 
The second concept, an atmospheric cutoff altitude, is necessary because our 
atmosphere model was not continuous for all altitudes. Examination of Figure 2.4.d, which 
shows atmospheric attenuation for different nominal altitudes, revealed that attenuation at 
an altitude of 18 kilometers is less than            within all atmospheric windows. 
Thus, 18 kilometers was chosen as the atmospheric cutoff altitude. 
To find the distance along a straight line from the system deployment location to the 
atmospheric cutoff altitude of 18 kilometers (    ), Eq. (3.3.p) is solved for the range (  ), 
replacing             with  , and evaluating the result at     . 
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  √                                  (3.3.s) 
      
    
         
                    (3.3.t) 
  
                           
        
    (3.3.u) 
The form of Eq. (3.3.u) reveals a quadratic polynomial. Thus, a solution for the range 
(  ) is found as follows: 
   
                √                                     
 
 (3.3.v) 
        √(             )
 
                                (3.3.w) 
         √(             )
 
                                 (3.3.x) 
                 (3.3.y) 
If the maximum system range (    ), evaluated for an atmospheric attenuation of 
  (         ), is defined as shown in Eq. (3.3.z) to be          , then using the result 
arrived at in Eq. (3.3.x), the value of     , the distance over which the beam is attenuated 
by the atmosphere, can at last be defined as         if           is greater than        ; 
otherwise,      is equal to      at the point where     , evaluated for an atmospheric 
attenuation of            is equal to     , where      is defined as some distance ranging 
between 0 and        , as is shown in Eqs. (3.3.z) and (3.3.aa). 
              |     (      )
 (3.3.z) 
        {
                                                                                           
                 |             
                            
 (3.3.aa) 
Given the definition of      in Eq. (3.3.aa),      must be defined as well. The value of 
     is calculated numerically in MATLAB. Given that the maximum distance a beam will 
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travel through the atmosphere while being attenuated is        , MATLAB sets the value of 
     equal to an initialized step size ( ) and increases it by integral multiples of   until its 
value reaches        . Although the step size is parametric, a default step size of 0.5 
kilometers was defined. For each value of     , the average altitude (    ) was calculated 
by summing half of       for ranges of      and       . The calculation of      is shown 
below in Eq. (3.3.bb). 
             
             
 
 
               
 
 (3.3.bb) 
For each average altitude (            ) along the path of the beam, the total 
attenuation (         ) is found, multiplied by the step size ( ), and stored as an element in 
an array. Each of these elements defines the attenuation for one step of the beam’s path. 
This step attenuation is defined as               in Eq. (3.3.cc) below. Additionally, while 
looping over each value of     , the conditions of     , defined in Eq. (3.3.aa), are checked. 
If      is defined, the loop is exited and the step attenuations are summed over the range 
of [      ] to form        .  
                    (            )    (3.3.cc) 
        ∑              
    
      
 (3.3.dd) 
This summation can then be used to define the maximum system range in terms of 
some angle  . Substituting         for    is shown in Eq. (3.3.ee). 
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(3.3.ee) 
For a ground-based system, the maximum system range is a function of the firing 
angle  . To determine the complete range of a system, one must sweep the firing angle 
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between   and   radians. This sweep is done in MATLAB by dividing the angle into a large 
number of divisions and calculating the angle at each division. Although the number of 
divisions was handled parametrically, a default of 5,000 divisions was defined. 
3.3.3 Effective System Range 
As described in Section 3.2, the critical altitude (  ) is the height that an HPM must 
hit a target by to induce a mission kill. The maximum system range of a ground-based 
system (    ), however, is often capable of reaching beyond this altitude. Thus, it is 
necessary to define an effective system range (    ) which is defined as the farthest a beam 
fired from an HPM system can propagate while delivering the minimum required intensity, 
accounting for all deployment considerations, and remaining effective should it come into 
contact with a target. This range is mathematically described below by Eq. (3.3.ff). 
        ,
                    (         )    
                                                          
 (3.3.ff) 
Shown here,      is defined by the maximum system range as long as the altitude of 
the beam, given by      (         ), is less than the critical altitude (  ). When the 
maximum system range has an altitude in excess of the critical altitude, however, the 
effective range is then defined by the distance along a straight line from the system 
deployment location to the critical altitude (        ). 
Thus far, three ranges for an HPM system have been described:     ,     , and     . 
To further clarify each of these ranges, their definitions have been organized below in 
Table 3.3.a. 
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HPM Range Definition 
Maximum Vacuum Range (    ) 
The farthest a microwave beam can propagate while delivering a level of 
intensity greater than or equal to the minimum required intensity (    ). 
Maximum System Range (    ) 
The farthest a microwave beam can propagate while delivering a level of 
intensity greater than or equal to the minimum required intensity (     ) 
and accounting for all deployment considerations, such as atmospheric 
attenuation. 
Effective System Range (    ) 
The farthest a microwave beam can propagate while delivering a level of 
intensity greater than or equal to the minimum required intensity (     ), 
accounting for all deployment considerations, such as atmospheric 
attenuation, and remaining at an altitude below or equal to the critical 
altitude (  ). 
Table 3.3.a: HPM Range Definitions 
Three ranges for an HPM system have been described. Their definitions reveal that the maximum system range 
(    ) is less than or equal to the maximum vacuum range (    ) and that the effective system range (    ) is less 
than or equal to the maximum system range (    ). 
Further discussion of these ranges is aided be the geometry presented in Figure 
3.3.d. 
 
Figure 3.3.d: HPM Range Geometry 
For an HPM system deployed at the location (    ), the distance a microwave beam fired at a firing angle   will 
propagate for different conditions is defined at the maximum vacuum range (    ), which is shown as a dotted 
black line, the maximum system range (    ), which is shown as a dotted red line, and the effective system range 
(    ), which is shown as a dotted blue line and is shaded in. Also of note are the points (     ) and (     ). The 
former is known as the critical intersection and represents the point at which the downrange of the effective 
system range (for a given system) is greatest. The latter, meanwhile, defines the point at which the downrange of 
the effective system range (for a given critical altitude) reaches its maximum value. 
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For a system deployed at the location (    ) in a Cartesian coordinate system, which 
contains a cross-section of a spherical Earth model at the point (     ), where    is the 
equatorial radius of the Earth, cross-sections of an HPM system’s range is depicted as 
“bubbles” extending from the deployment location. Seen above in Figure 3.3.d, the three 
ranges which have been defined thus far are shown. The maximum vacuum range (    ), 
being a constant for a given set of system parameters, is shown as a dotted black line and 
takes the form of a half-circle. The maximum system range (    ), a function of the firing 
angle due to atmospheric attenuation, is shown as a dotted red line. As the firing angle is 
swept,      reflects the quantity of low atmosphere the beam passes through. For angles 
near the horizon, the amount of low-level atmosphere traveled through is great, and thus 
     is much less than     . While for angles near vertical, the amount of low-level 
atmosphere traveled through is small and      is close to     . Finally, the effective system 
range (    ), which is shown as a dotted blue line, is shaded in. As can be seen, as the firing 
angle, as measured from the local horizon, is swept from   to          , the effective 
system range follows the maximum system range until the altitude reached would exceed 
the critical altitude. This point, labeled as (     ), is defined as the critical intersection 
point and represents the farthest downrange that a particular system can achieve. Note 
that for different combinations of system parameters, the range bubbles will change, thus 
affecting the position of (     ). 
There does exist, however, another point of significance which does not change with 
system parameters, but rather with the critical altitude (  ). The maximum downrange 
point (     ) defines the point at which the downrange of a beam reaches the maximum 
possible value for a given critical altitude. Or alternatively, it represents the point where a 
beam fired at           reaches an altitude above the surface equal to the critical altitude. 
Using the definition of the critical altitude, and the geometry of the system as previously 
described, it is possible to derive an equation for the maximum possible downrange that 
can be achieved for a given critical altitude. 
The equation for a circle, shown in Eq. (3.3.gg), is modified to describe the path 
followed by the critical altitude in Figure 3.3.d by using a radius equal to the equatorial 
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radius of the Earth plus the critical altitude (       ), an   offset of zero (   ), and a 
  offset of one Earth radius below the origin (     ). The equation of a circle which 
describes the path of the critical altitude is seen in Eq. (3.3.hh). 
                 (3.3.gg) 
         
         
  (3.3.hh) 
Rearranging Eq. (3.3.hh) for   gives: 
  √                 (3.3.ii) 
Given that the maximum downrange occurs at the point (     ), the point    is 
found by calculating the point of intersection of the line      and Eq. (3.3.ii). Substituting 
   for   in Eq. (3.3.ii) produces: 
   √                  (3.3.jj) 
With the maximum downrange point defined, a right-triangle can be formed with 
points at the center of the Earth (     ), the system deployment location (    ), and the 
maximum downrange point (     ). Using this triangle, the law of sines is used to find the 
angle ( ), which when multiplied with the Earth’s radius (  ), defines the maximum 
possible downrange (      ). 
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This maximum downrange is used to perform a quick assessment of whether an 
HPM system, for a given critical altitude, can cover a particular country. If the distance from 
a country’s borders to its center exceeds       , then an HPM system would be incapable 
(regardless of its system parameters) of providing coverage. 
3.4 Space-Based System Analysis 
As described in Section 3.2, for a given target, there exists a critical altitude (  ) 
which is the greatest height an ICBM traveling 5,500 kilometers can be hit during boost 
phase to induce a mission kill. Consequently, an HPM system that guarantees worldwide 
coverage at    would be able to successfully intercept ICBMs travelling greater downrange 
distances as well.  To calculate worldwide coverage, an HPM system must be able to reach 
   at all times and all places.  Using a spherical Earth model, this worldwide coverage 
qualifier describes a sphere surface of required coverage (                 [  ]) with a 
radius equal to the radius of the Earth (  ) plus   . 
Analysis using the    coverage approach can only be performed for a given ICBM 
type, however. As discussed in section 2.1.1.2, liquid fueled missiles burn longer than solid 
fuel missiles to reach the same distance. Additionally, the design of the missile itself, such 
as its mass and aerodynamics also influence burn time. Therefore, calculating    for an 
ICBM can only be done for a specified ICBM profile. The user of MECSTAR is expected to 
supply the ICBM profile, or can choose to use the program’s default profile, which 
characterizes a generic solid fueled ICBM. Alternatively, a user can opt to specify    without 
modeling a specific ICBM. 
Given that a space-based system’s orbital altitude can be assumed to be above the 
critical cutoff altitude of 18 kilometers (as defined in Section 3.3.2), an HPM satellite's 
maximum system range (    ) is equal to the maximum vacuum range (    ), as defined in 
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Eq. (3.1.m). Therefore, an HPM system’s volume of coverage in free space is a sphere with a 
radius equal to the maximum system range (    ) of the system. When an HPM satellite is 
placed in orbit at a particular altitude (  ),    must intersect an HPM's coverage volume, 
else no coverage can be assumed.      describes the two-dimensional cross section of    
and is a circle with a radius equal to       (cross section plane includes origin of   ). The 
function      describes the two-dimensional cross section of an HPM coverage volume and 
is a circle with a radius equal to      (cross section plane includes origin of coverage 
volume). Intersection is tested by describing      and      on a plane that touches the 
orbital path of the HPM satellite at all points. If      and      are ever equal to eachother, 
then an intersection exists. For example: if the range of the system is 10 km, the critical 
altitude is 20 km, and the system is in orbit at 100 km, the system would be unable to reach 
the critical altitude from that orbit, translating into no guaranteed coverage.  In cases 
where    and the coverage volume intersect, the intersection appears as a shallow bowl 
(  ) opening towards the Earth. The radius of the circle shown by projecting    onto a two-
dimensional plane (a plane containing the lip of the “bowl”), is called the projected radius 
(  ). The path from the center of   , following the surface of   , to the edge of   , is called 
the projected arc (  ). From the center of the Earth, each point of    is exactly       
away because it exists exactly at the critical altitude above Earth. The angle swept from the 
center of    to the edge of    from the perspective of the center of the Earth is called the 
sigma sweep ( ). The described geometry is shown on a plane that touches the orbital path 
of the HPM satellite at all points in Figure 3.4.a. Further details on how the described values 
were calculated can be found in Appendix B: Background Space Methods Calculations. 
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Figure 3.4.a: Two-Dimensional Satellite Coverage Outline 
Earth and an HPM satellite's coverage range, both with origins resting on the x-axis of a Cartesian coordinate 
plane. All values are in kilometers unless otherwise noted. The orange area bounded by    and    is the side view 
of a    “bowl” opening towards Earth. 
Complete coverage is realized by patterning    bowls onto the critical surface    
while leaving no spacial gaps.  In order to obtain world coverage, a polar orbit is assumed 
because it is the only orbit to cross all latitudes, as discussed in section 2.5.2.1. A constant 
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orbital altitude is used so that the geometry describing    does not vary during the orbital 
period. Continuous worldwide coverage necessitates a minimum number of orbital rings 
(       ), and a minimum number of satellites per orbital ring (         ). A solution is found 
when the least amount of    coverage overlap is calculated while leaving no coverage gaps. 
Being as the orbital rings will be at their greatest separation at the equator (polar orbits 
travel parallel to longitudes so they spread in the same manner), minimum coverage is 
calculated there. 
Polar orbital rings exclusively exist on planes that are parallel to longitudes; a given 
orbital plane will perfectly bisect the Earth. Every point on a polar orbital ring must be 
within range of an HPM satellite to insure continuous coverage along the ring. However, as 
seen in Figure 3.4.b, if    coverage zones are placed edge to edge around the orbital ring, 
the there is no guaranteed minimum coverage width (                   ) because the 
satellites in the ring move relative to the surface of the Earth as a function of time. Note 
that   is an arc length because it exists at the critical surface,   . 
 
Figure 3.4.b: Errant Example of Full Orbital Path Coverage 
Figure is zoomed in to the Equator locale at the critical altitude. As seen in the figure, the coverage cross sections 
(  ) are lined along an arbitrary orbital path edge to edge. Though complete coverage exists along the orbital 
path, the path has no guaranteed minimum width at a given point as    sections move along the orbital path. 
Therefore,    sections must be moved closer together in order to have a non-zero minimum width. 
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The lack of   is a critical observation that must be acknowledged when calculating 
the total number of satellites in an orbital ring because it necessitates having to move    
coverage zones closer together in order to guarantee a non-zero   on the orbital path. 
The method used to guarantee a non-zero   is to approximate the    coverage zone as a 
three-dimensional “hexagon” (  ) at the critical altitude, and to align the “hexagons” edge 
to edge (see Figure 3.4.c). Being as    is a subset of the surface of   ,    has the same 
“bowl” like feature. 
 
Figure 3.4.c: Valid Example of Full Orbital Path Coverage 
Figure is zoomed in to the Equator locale at the critical altitude. As seen in the figure, the “hexagonal” coverage 
zones (  ) are lined along an arbitrary orbital path edge to edge. Complete coverage exists along the polar orbit 
path, with a non-zero guaranteed minimum width (  ). 
An    is ideally constructed by using equilateral three-dimensional “triangles,” as 
shown in Figure 3.4.d (see Appendix A: Equilateral Hexagon Proof). The “triangles” exist as 
a subset of the surface of   . Each side of a “triangle” is an arc length equal to the project 
arc,   . Exactly one vertex of each “triangle” exists at the center of the surface of   . The 
remaining vertices of the “triangles” exist at the corresponding vertices of   . The 
abbreviated projected arc (  ) describes the path traveled from the center of an    to the 
middle of an arbitrary outside edge of   . 
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Figure 3.4.d: Constructing a Coverage “Hexagon” 
Viewpoint from center of Earth is shown looking onto the intersection of an HPM’s coverage volume with the 
critical surface (  , middle pink circle).  The intersection is fitted by three-dimensional coverage “hexagon” (  , 
right blue “hexagon”), made of equilateral “triangles” (left figure) with “side” lengths equal to the projected arc 
  . The blue dashed line in the rightmost figure is equal to the abbreviated projected arc,   . The value of    is 
approximated by projecting an equilateral “triangle” onto a plane defined by the three vertices of same the 
“triangle,” and applying Pythagorean Theorem. 
Being as the hexagons must be arranged edge to edge to insure no gaps, the maximum 
adjacent satellite spacing (    ) is twice   . 
          (3.4.a) 
As the orbital rings approach the poles, they begin to overlap, and they completely overlap 
at the poles themselves, so coverage does not have to be reanalyzed outside of the equator 
locale. 
Being as    zones are made from equilateral “triangles” as shown in Figure 3.4.d, the 
coverage width arc of an orbital path over time cycles between    and     . As shown in 
Figure 3.4.e, overlapping coverage using orbital rings composed of    zones is minimized 
by alternating the “phase” between adjacent rings, but also has the effect of making the 
coverage width arc of adjacent pairs of orbital paths a constant value of three times    (see 
Eq. (3.4.c)). 
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Figure 3.4.e: Alternating Orbital Paths 
By constructing orbital rings out of iterations of   , overlapping coverage is minimized by alternating the “phase” 
of adjacent orbital rings. Being as satellites following an odd or even phase (phase names are arbitrary) still 
cover the same distance during their orbital periods, the phase offset between adjacent rings remains constant 
over time. The coverage width arc of a paired odd and even phase orbital path remains constant, though it will 
cyclically shift on the horizontal axis defined by the Equator. 
The total number of satellites per ring (         ) is equal to the circumference of a 
circle with a radius of       (an arbitrary longitudinal cross-section of   ), divided by the 
maximum satellite distance (    ). The ceiling function necessitates an integer number of 
satellites. 
          ⌈
           
    
⌉ (3.4.b) 
For a hexagonal arrangement of satellites, finding the optimal number of rings 
(       ) is non-intuitive. Notably, full coverage only needs to be calculated for a single 
hemisphere (Earth divided along an arbitrary longitude, 00/1800 used in examples) 
because a single HPM satellite in a polar orbit symmetrically covers two hemispheres 
during its orbital period (see Figure 3.4.f). 
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Figure 3.4.f: Polar Orbit Path over North Pole with Arbitrary Hemispheres 
Top-Down view of Earth is shown with a polar orbit path. The red and blue zones show complementary but 
arbitrary hemispheres. Note that all polar orbit paths inherently cross the poles because they travel parallel to 
longitudes. Therefore, polar orbit paths are described as traveling exclusively on planes perpendicular to the x-z 
axis which pass through the origin (North Pole) shown in this figure. Due to the orbital path symmetry across the 
origin, once a full array of orbital paths has been arranged for full coverage for an arbitrary hemisphere, the 
complimentary hemisphere is covered as well. 
Coverage analysis begins by grouping two adjacent satellite rings of which have a 
total width (      in km) of three times    at the equator (see Eq. (3.4.c)). 
           (3.4.c) 
The grouping is necessary because the width of a single satellite ring at the equator is not a 
constant value; the width alternates between    and     . However, the width of a pair of 
rings is constant. The relation of alternating widths to    is most easily observed in Figure 
3.4.c through Figure 3.4.e. 
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Once adjacent satellite rings are paired, half the circumference of a circle with a 
radius of       (a    latitudinal cross-section of    called    , see Eq. (3.4.d)) is divided 
by      and rounded up to the nearest integer to insure an integer number of satellite ring 
pairs (      , see Eq. (3.4.e)). Orbital ring patterning begins at an arbitrary longitude, and 
finishes at the arbitrary longitude plus 1800 (see Figure 3.4.g, uses 00 as starting longitude 
reference). 
              (3.4.d) 
       ⌈
   
     
⌉ (3.4.e) 
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Figure 3.4.g: Satellite Coverage Initialization Reference 
Zoomed in view of coverage rings in equator locale is shown. Vertical dashed line shows division between Earth 
hemispheres at 00 longitude. Horizontal dash line represents the Equator. Orbital ring pairs Orbital ring pairs are 
repeated until coverage is completed from 00-1800 longitude. Due to the symmetry shown in Figure 3.4.f, if 
coverage is complete from 00-1800 it is also complete from 1800 to 3600. 
However, the pairing method may cause too many rings to be added when presented with 
the situation shown in Figure 3.4.h. 
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Figure 3.4.h: Satellite Orbit Coverage Gap Example 
Zoomed in view of coverage rings in equator locale is shown. Vertical dashed line shows division between Earth 
hemispheres at 1800 longitude. Horizontal dash line represents the Equator. Note that the orbital paths travel in 
opposing directions due to the symmetry shown in Figure 3.4.f. Orbital rings from 1800 to 3600 are continuations 
of orbital rings from 00 to less than 1800.  All longitudes have continuous coverage except for the coverage gap 
shown. The coverage gap will be at its maximum value at the equator because polar orbit paths converge outside 
of this locale. 
Because rings are being added in groups of two, the computation will add another group of 
two rings in order to close the maximum coverage gap shown in Figure 3.4.h, even though 
possibly only one ring is needed. The “only one ring needed” condition 
(                                 ) is found by removing one ring pair from the total 
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rings, then adding the least width of a single ring (  ) and then checking to see if the total 
distance covered is still greater than    . 
        {
              (        )              
                                                                 
 (3.4.f) 
As seen in Eq. (3.4.g), if         evaluates to false, then the total number of orbital rings 
(       ) is simply twice the number of orbital ring pairs (      ). However, if         
evaluates to true, meaning one less ring is required for full coverage, then        is twice 
       minus one. 
        {
                                            
                                                              
 (3.4.g) 
Because       is insured to be an integer due to the ceiling function and that Eq. (3.4.g) 
just performs subtraction and multiplication with whole numbers,        is insured to be 
an integer value as well. 
The total number of satellites (      ) is calculated by multiplying the number of 
satellites per ring (         ) and the total number of orbital rings (       ). 
                         (3.4.h) 
Note that       does not have to be rounded because both        and          are integer 
values. 
3.5 MECSTAR – Program Structure 
The MECSTAR coverage analysis tool was written in the MATLAB programming 
language. Classes were used to represent components of an effective coverage simulation 
by storing specific parameters in class properties and implementing calculations in 
methods. The design of this tool followed a top-down approach. First, the high-level 
structure was developed, followed by the lower level implementation. 
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3.5.1 High-Level Structure 
MECSTAR's code base is broken into five functional blocks: profiles, models, 
simulations, configurations, and the graphical user interface. Each block is represented via 
as a package in the code base and contains classes responsible for handling a core piece of 
functionality. The structure of these packages with respect to a general project “root” 
package can be seen in Figure 3.5.a below in the form of a unified modeling language (UML) 
diagram. 
 
Figure 3.5.a: High-Level Package Structure Diagram of MECSTAR 
Each of the five functional blocks is represented with a package in MECSTAR’s code base. The configuration and 
graphical user interface blocks are contained in the packages “config” and “gui” within the project “root” package. 
The three remaining packages, “models,” “profiles,” and “simulations,” are contained with an organizational 
package “core.” 
As depicted, only two of the packages, “config” and “gui” exist at the “root” level 
while an additional “core” package groups the “models,” “profiles,” and “sims” packages. 
These three packages are grouped because of their direct contributions to the core 
functionality of the MECSTAR tool. Meanwhile, the “config” and “gui” packages are left in 
the root package as they are more tangential to the core operation of the tool. 
The “profiles” package contains classes and packages which describe each of the 
three input profiles: defense, sensor, and threat. The “models” package contains classes 
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which assist profile and simulation classes with calculations involving natural 
phenomenon. The “config” package contains classes which provide a means of saving and 
loading both profiles and simulations from previous program sessions. The “gui” package 
contains classes which provide a simple and intuitive way of running simulations, saving 
and loading configurations, and viewing results. Finally, the “simulations” package contains 
classes which coordinate profile and model classes for coverage simulations. 
3.5.1.1 Package - root::core::profiles 
The “profiles” package contains classes and packages which programmatically 
describe each of the three input profiles: defense, sensor, and threat. Within MECSTAR, a 
class which describes all of the parameters for a particular defense, sensor, or threat is 
referred to as a profile class. A UML diagram below in Figure 3.5.b is used to depict the 
“profiles” package’s classes and packages. 
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Figure 3.5.b: Class-Level Structure Diagram of Profiles Package 
The “profiles” package contains a sub-package for each of the input profile types of defenses, sensors, and 
threats. Each of these sub-packages defines an abstract top-level profile class such as DefenseProfile. From this 
top-level class, a number of abstract, scope-specific classes such as SingleDefenseProfile are derived. Finally, from 
the scope-specific classes, concrete, type specific classes such as SingleElectromagneticDefense-Profile are 
derived. 
The “profiles” package defines three additional sub-packages: “defenses,” “sensors,” 
and “threats.” Each of these packages directly correlates to one of the three input profiles 
and defines an abstract, top-level profile class. For the input defense profile, sensor profile, 
and threat profile, the associated top-level profile classes are DefenseProfile, SensorProfile, 
and ThreatProfile. Each of these profile classes subclasses an additional abstract class named 
ProfileBase. 
In MECSTAR, an input profile has a particular “scope” associated with it. A scope 
dictates what can be thought of as the level of commitment in a particular area or realm. 
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For example, a number of potential scopes are “Single”, “Theater”, and “Global”. A scope of 
“Single” indicates in the case of the defense and sensor platforms, that an element is 
deployed in a single fixed location, or, in the case of the threat profile, is traveling between 
two known points. Alternatively, in the case of defense and sensor platforms, a scope of 
“Global” would indicate that an element is deployed in such a way as to be effective over 
the entire Earth, or, in the case of the threat profile, is traveling between two unknown 
points. As indicated in Figure 3.5.b by the abstract subclasses, such as SingleDefenseProfile, of 
profile base classes, such as DefenseProfile, this project dealt with single and global defense 
profiles, global sensor profiles, and global threat profiles. 
In addition to “scope”, each input profile has a particular “type” associated with it. A 
type dictates what can be thought of as the method of action. Each type of profile for a 
given scope is represented as a concrete class such as SingleElectromagneticDefense-Profile 
which subclasses its respective scope class, SingleDefenseProfile. Note that it is this final level 
of classes, specific to both scope, and type, which are, by design, instantiable. All other 
profile classes are, by design, abstract and cannot be constructed. This abstraction of 
classes ensures that no simulation can be run using an element profile class which does not 
specify the necessary scope and type information. Furthermore, the use of abstract base 
classes allows for the flexibility to define a specific type of element profile as only being 
valid for a single scope. 
3.5.1.2 Package - root::core::models 
The “models” package contains classes which assist profile and simulation classes 
with calculations involving natural phenomenon. A UML diagram below in Figure 3.5.c is 
used to depict the “models” package’s classes. 
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Figure 3.5.c: Class-Level Structure Diagram of Models Package 
The “models” package contains a single class EarthModel. This class defines an atmospheric model for 
electromagnetic wave propagation. 
The single class of the “models” package, EarthModel, defines an atmospheric model 
for electromagnetic wave propagation for altitudes which range from sea level to 18 
kilometers. The Earth model was implemented as a static class so profile classes have 
uniform access to its methods when performing their own internal calculations. 
3.5.1.3 Package - root::core::sims 
The “sims” package contains classes which coordinate profile and model classes for 
coverage simulations. A UML diagram below in Figure 3.5.d is used to depict the “sims” 
package’s classes. 
 
Figure 3.5.d: Class-Level Structure Diagram of Simulations Package 
The “sims” package contains a single class, Simulation. This class defines the execution path for a coverage 
simulation and returns a results struct from its RunSimulation() method. 
The single class of the “sims” package, Simulation, defines the execution path for a 
MECSTAR coverage simulation. This functionality is accomplished by calling upon functions 
that the concrete profile classes must implement due their abstract ancestry. 
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Similarly to profile classes, simulations can also be saved. Given that, internally, the 
Simulation class holds references to three profile classes, a simulation only needs the three 
profile classes to run; thus, it can be defined in terms of the referenced profile classes. If the 
referenced profile classes are saved as configurations, so too can the simulation itself be 
saved. 
3.5.1.4 Package - root::config 
The “config” package contains classes which provide a means of saving and loading 
both profiles and simulations as MATLAB data files from previous program sessions. The 
UML diagram below in Figure 3.5.e is used to depict the “config” package’s classes and 
directories. 
 
Figure 3.5.e: Class-Level Structure Diagram of Configuration Package 
The “config” package contains a single class ConfigHelper and a structure of various subdirectories which store 
configuration files. The first level of subdirectories specifies the profile type, defenses, sensors, or threats. The 
second level of subdirectories specifies the scope, single or global. The third level of level of subdirectories 
specifies the platform type. In the third level of subdirectories, MAT-files store saved profile configurations. 
The “config” package contains a single helper subclass ConfigHelper which provides 
an interface to saving and loading profile configurations. This helper class defines methods 
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for retrieving lists of available profile configurations as well as methods for saving new 
profiles. Profile configurations make use of MATLAB’s built-in save and load functions which 
allow one to save and load workspace variables to special MATLAB formatted binary files 
(MAT-files) with an extension of .mat. To save a particular profile configuration, MECSTAR 
in fact saves an entire instance of a class. Thus, all of the class’s parameters are preserved 
as well as its type. This method is preferable to other means of saving configurations, such 
as flat files which introduce unnecessary overhead. 
In addition to the ConfigHelper class, the “config” package contains a directory 
structure for storing profile configuration files. In order to differentiate between profile 
types, scopes, and platform types, three levels of directories are used. In the third directory 
level, MAT-files are stored which contain the configuration instance variables. To further 
illustrate this directory structure, consider a saved electromagnetic defense profile named 
“HPM” with a global scope. Such a configuration MAT-file would be located by the following 
file path: ./root/config/defenses/global/electromagnetic/HPM.mat. 
3.5.1.5 Package - root::gui 
The “gui” package contains classes which provide a simple and intuitive way of 
running simulations, saving and loading configurations, and viewing results. A UML 
diagram below in Figure 3.5.f is used to depict the “gui” package’s classes and directories. 
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Figure 3.5.f: Class-Level Structure Diagram of Graphical User Interface Package 
The “gui” package contains a single class, GuiHelper, an executable script, main.m, and a GUI figure, main.fig. The 
files, main.m and main.fig, are products of MATLAB’s GUIDE program which was used to construct the layout of 
buttons, text, and user inputs. The GuiHelper class is used to facilitate advanced GUI actions such as automatically 
graying out user input controls. 
The graphical user interface (GUI) was developed using MATLAB’s GUI design 
environment (GUIDE) program. This interface design program was used to construct the 
layout of buttons, text, user inputs for each for the input elements, and program outputs. 
Figure 3.5.g shows the layout of the program with fields populated with default values. 
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Figure 3.5.g: Graphical User Interface Screenshot 
The GUI handles all input/output for MECSTAR. Inputs include operating frequency, antenna diameter, signal 
power, power on target, estimated shielding loss, boost margin, and orbital altitude. Outputs include maximum 
range, critical altitude, equivalent earth footprint, satellites per orbital ring, total orbital rings, total satellites, 
and dynamic relational graphs. 
When using the GUIDE program, MATLAB figure, main.fig, and script, main.m, files are 
automatically created to define the component layout and callback functionality 
respectively. In addition to these files, it was necessary to create a GUI helper class, 
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GuiHelper, to facilitate several more advanced GUI actions such as automatically graying out 
user input controls based on possible parameter selections and form validation. 
3.5.2 Class UML Diagram 
The following unified modeling language (UML) diagram in Figure 3.5.h below 
indicates the complete internal structure of the previously mentioned classes and 
packages. 
 
Figure 3.5.h: Class UML Diagram 
Each of the five functional blocks is represented with a package in MECSTAR’s code base. Each package defines 
additional classes and packages as necessary. 
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4 Results 
In considering ground and space-based high-powered microwave (HPM) platforms 
for boost phase interception, the maximum vacuum range (    ) of the system is a critical 
factor in determining the deployment possibilities. Given in Eq. (3.1.m), the formula for 
     relates parameters such as operating frequency, antenna diameter, and signal power. 
The effect of each parameter on the maximum vacuum range is generalized below in Table 
4.0.a. 
System Parameter Relation to Maximum Vacuum Range (    ) 
Operating Frequency Positive (Linear) 
Antenna Diameter Positive (Linear) 
Signal Power Positive (Root) 
Intensity on Target Negative (Linear) 
Electromagnetic Shielding Negative (Exponential) 
Table 4.0.a: Generalized Range Relations 
The maximum vacuum range (    ) is positively influenced by operating frequency, antenna diameter, and signal 
power. Additionally, it is negatively influenced by the required intensity on target, and the electromagnetic 
shielding of the target. 
As shown, three of the five system parameters have a positive correlation to the 
maximum vacuum range (    ). An increase in a positively correlated parameter increases 
    . The remaining two parameters have a negative correlation to     . An increase in a 
negatively correlated parameter decreases     . 
The generalized range relations above are based purely on the natural divergence of 
the microwave beam and therefore do not necessarily hold for a ground-based systems 
where other effects, such as atmospheric attenuation (which affects the relation of 
operating frequency) must be considered. 
As seen in Figure 2.4.e, the range of intensities which can effectively couple 
electromagnetic radiation is quite large, spanning eleven orders of magnitude. To cover this 
range, we introduced the concept of target Vulnerability Models (VMs). Given that the 
vulnerability of a target can be quantified by the intensity required to disrupt its guidance 
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electronics, each VM considered was primarily defined around a specific intensity level. 
Shown below in Figure 4.0.a, our analysis of HPM systems was performed using three VMs 
defined by intensities of        ⁄ ,      ⁄  , and           ⁄ . 
 
Figure 4.0.a: Vulnerability Model Intensity Levels on Logarithmic Scale 
To cover the spectrum of intensities required to couple a microwave beam to a target’s circuitry, three 
vulnerability models were used. 
Specifically, VM 1-3 were chosen represent highly vulnerable, moderately 
vulnerable, and highly resistant targets respectively. Each VM, the results of which are 
detailed in the following sections, consisted of a core value set and a number of sweep 
values or limits. For each VM, being as there are too many dimensions to sweep on a single 
graph, the core values are each swept independently in order to show system effectiveness 
relations with respect to each considered parameter. 
4.1 Ground Basing 
For each of the three aforementioned VMs, results for ground-based HPM platforms 
were generated. As mentioned in Section 2.4.3, the atmospheric attenuation model used in 
this analysis required a number of parameters to be initialized. 
For the results generated in the following sections, environmental data for the 
country of Iraq was used. Specifically, regional yearly averages were taken for pressure 
(            ), temperature (        ), and water vapor density (       
 ⁄ ). 
Two general types of plots were used to demonstrate the effect of different 
parameters on the maximum and effective ranges of the system. 
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4.1.1 Plot Types 
Explained in detail below, two-dimensional “Earth” plots depict the maximum 
system and effective ranges as they extend from the surface of the earth. Three-
dimensional “Downrange Surface” plots show the downrange from the platform as a 
function of various parameters. Each of the two types of plots is exemplified by Figure 4.1.a 
below. 
 
 (a) (b) 
Figure 4.1.a: Ground-Based Plot Types 
Example (a) “Earth” and (b) “Downrange Surface” plots are shown for a ground-based HPM system. 
 
4.1.1.1 Earth Plots 
As described in Section 3.3.1, the Earth is modeled as a sphere with a radius equal to 
the Earth’s equatorial radius (             ). In an “Earth” plot, a two-dimensional 
cross-section of this spherical Earth model is placed in a Cartesian coordinate system with 
the topmost point of the Earth’s surface residing at the origin and the center of the cross-
section residing at the point (     ). Then, from the point (    ), where    is the 
deployment altitude of an HPM system, the maximum system range (    ) of a ground-
based HPM system, as defined in Eq. (3.3.ee), is plotted as a single plot line for a firing angle 
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( ) ranging between   and   radians. Finally, the effective system range (    ), as defined 
in Eq. (3.3.ff), is plotted and shaded in. An example “Earth” plot can be seen below in Figure 
4.1.b. Note that because the Earth was modeled as a sphere, the results presented would 
seem to be valid regardless of an HPM’s actual location. This observation is not the case, 
however, as the atmospheric model required initial conditions for temperature, pressure, 
and water vapor. As noted in the introduction to this section (4.1), these values were 
initialized to environmental data specific to the country of Iraq. Thus, the results are only 
valid for locations matching the general temperature, pressure, and humidity of Iraq. 
 
Figure 4.1.b: Example Ground-Based “Earth” Plot 
Plot of a ground-based HPM’s range as it sits on the Earth. The outer plot represents the systems maximum range 
while the shaded area represents the system’s effective range. 
Figure 4.1.b is indicative of an “Earth” plot for a set of core model values. “Earth” 
plots of core model values are identified by a solid red maximum system range (    ) plot 
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line and an effective system range (    ) filled in with dark red. Given that an “Earth” plot 
is really an image of the platform range viewed at platform “eye level,” the axes do not 
represent specific parameters, but rather represent the distance in kilometers. All “Earth” 
plots have square axes so as to prevent a distortion of the image. 
The legend of each “Earth” plot contains useful information as well. While the 
maximum system range, effective system range, and Earth surface are all clearly marked, 
the effective system range entry contains two additional pieces of information. The first 
element in parenthesis following the effective range entry is a percentage of the maximum 
range represented by the effective range. This percentage is found by taking the total area 
of the maximum system range and dividing it by the area circumscribed by the effective 
system range. For example, the “Earth” plot in Figure 4.1.b depicts a system whose effective 
range comprises        of the maximum range. The second parenthetical element 
meanwhile corresponds to the firing angle (       in Figure 4.1.b) needed to achieve an 
effective range which has the farthest downrange. This point is also known as the critical 
intersection and is defined in Figure 3.3.d. 
 “Earth” plots are also generated for parameter sweeps. An example of such a plot 
can be seen below in Figure 4.1.c. 
101 
 
 
Figure 4.1.c: Example Ground-Based "Earth" Plot with Parameter Sweep 
Plot of a ground-based HPM’s ranges as it sits on the Earth for various operating frequencies. The outer plots 
represent the maximum ranges of the system for the specified operating frequencies while the shaded areas 
represent the system’s effective range. 
In “Earth” plots with parameter sweeps, the core case values are always plotted in 
red as a reference with the effective range shaded dark red. Additionally, for each set of 
model plots, the axes for “Earth” plots are held constant to permit comparisons between 
each of the plots for a given case. This effort to enable comparisons is exemplified by Figure 
4.1.b and Figure 4.1.c which both use axis limits of [              ] for the  -     and 
[               ] for the  -    . 
When plotting parameter sweeps, the legend specifies the value of the swept 
parameter for each of the figure’s subplots. As identified by the legend of the plot in Figure 
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4.1.c, the system’s range was plotted for operating frequencies of       ,       ,       , 
       , and        . 
4.1.1.2 Earth Plot Accuracy 
The distance accuracy of “Earth” plots is described using two values: the range 
accuracy and angular accuracy. 
 
Figure 4.1.d: Distance Accuracy of "Earth" and "Altitude/Downrange" Plots Examined 
If for a firing angle (            ), within an angular accuracy (             ), a range point is calculated to have 
some range (       ), within an accuracy (        ), then its actual location lies between the points    and    on 
the X axis and    and    on the Y axis. 
As shown above in Figure 4.1.d, for a given range (       ) and firing angle 
(            ), a particular range point’s actual position varies as a function of the range, 
firing angle, range accuracy (        ), and angular accuracy (             ). Figure 4.1.d 
defines the points   ,   ,   , and    which bound the potential locations of a range point. 
These bounding points may be calculated using Eqs. (4.1.a) through (4.1.d). 
                    (4.1.a) 
                    (4.1.b) 
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                    (4.1.c) 
                    (4.1.d) 
While we do not specifically utilize this analysis to assess the accuracy of our 
findings, each “Earth” plot included in the following sections specifies, within the caption, 
the range and angular accuracies used. Thus, this analysis is included to provide the reader 
with the tools and information necessary to determine the accuracy of a system’s range if 
they should be required to do so. 
4.1.1.3 Downrange Plots 
The second plot type, “Downrange,” shows the maximum range at the critical 
altitude as a function of two other parameters considered, and how those parameters affect 
the range at that altitude. Since the range is most highly varying with frequency because of 
atmospheric dependencies, frequency is held on for one of the independent axes. 
4.1.2 Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 
The first Vulnerability Model considered for a ground-based HPM system was a 
highly vulnerable target model. The core values of the ground-based Vulnerability Model 1 
(GB-VM1) can be seen below in Table 4.1.a. 
Parameter Name Core Value Units 
Operating Frequency     [   ] 
Antenna Diameter   [ ] 
Source Power    [  ] 
Intensity on Target      [    ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding    [  ] 
Critical Altitude     [  ] 
Table 4.1.a: Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 (Highly Vulnerable) - Core Values 
Vulnerability Model 1 was used to represent a highly vulnerable target model with a required intensity 
of         . 
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The sweep values for GB-VM1 can be seen below in Table 4.1.b. All parameter 
sweeps attempt to predictably span a range near the core value with the exception of 
frequency. Due to atmospheric attention, certain frequencies such as 60 GHz and 120 GHz 
are unusable. Such frequencies were avoided in parameter sweeps. 
Parameter Name Sweep Values Units 
Operating Frequency [                ] [   ] 
Antenna Diameter [         ] [ ] 
Source Power [              ] [  ] 
Intensity on Target [   ] [    ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding [              ] [  ] 
Critical Altitude [                   ] [  ] 
Table 4.1.b: Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 (Highly Vulnerable) - Sweep Values 
Vulnerability Model 1 sweep values indicate the values used for each parameter sweep in “Earth” plots. For 
example, when sweeping operating frequency,      ,      ,      ,       , and        were used. 
Using the core model values, “Earth” plots were generated. The “Earth” plot for the 
core GB-VM1 values can be seen below in Figure 4.1.e. The maximum horizontal range of 
GB-VM1 is ≈16,490 kilometers at a vertical location of ≈6,506 kilometers, while the 
maximum effective range is ≈1,091 kilometers at a vertical location of ≈8.537 kilometers. 
As the shaded effective range is indiscernible due to the scale of the plot, a higher-
resolution “Earth” plot in Figure 4.1.k visually confirms these results. 
Additional “Earth” plots for GB-VM1 which sweep the parameters of operating 
frequency, antenna diameter, source power, electromagnetic shielding, and critical altitude 
can be seen in Figure 4.1.f, Figure 4.1.g, Figure 4.1.h, Figure 4.1.i, and Figure 4.1.j 
respectively. Higher-resolution versions of the plots (labeled as “Enhanced”) which display 
the otherwise hidden effective ranges are included as well in Figure 4.1.k, Figure 4.1.l, 
Figure 4.1.m, Figure 4.1.n, Figure 4.1.o, and Figure 4.1.p. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Core Values 
 
Figure 4.1.e: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Core Values 
For the core values: The maximum horizontal range is ≈16,490 km at an altitude of ≈6,506 km. The maximum 
vertical range is ≈19,550 km. The effective range comprises ≈0.0272% of the maximum range and the critical 
intersection is encountered at a firing angle of ≈0.396°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. Note 
that due to the scale of this plot, the effective system range is not visible. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Operating Frequency 
 
Figure 4.1.f: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Operating Frequency 
For operating frequencies of 20 GHz, 40 GHz, 80 GHz, 100 GHz, and 140 GHz: Maximum horizontal ranges are 
≈3,763 km, 7,084 km, 12,730 km, 16,490 km, and 21,040 km at altitudes of ≈952.1 km, 2,289 km, 5,432 km, 6,506 
km, and 9,837 km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈4,075 km, 8,012 km, 15,430 km, 19,550 km, and 26,390 km. 
Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈1,445 km, 1,406 km, 1,057 km, 1,091 km, and 1,055 km at altitudes of 
≈1 km, 1 km, 13.62 km, 8.537 km, and 22.22 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective 
ranges comprise ≈0.5943%, 0.1556%, 0.046%, 0.0278%, and 0.0173% of the maximum range. The critical 
intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈0°, 0°, 0.684°, 0.396°, and 1.152°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range 
accuracy: 0.5 km. Note that due to the scale of this plot, the effective system range is not visible. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.1.g: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Antenna Diameter 
For antenna diameters of 1 m, 2 m, 3 m, 4 m, and 5 m: Maximum horizontal ranges are ≈5,497 km, 10,990 km, 
16,490 km, 21,990 km, and 27,480 km at altitudes of ≈2,169 km, 4,338 km, 6,506 km, 8,674 km, and 10,840 km. 
Maximum vertical ranges are ≈6,519 km, 13,040 km, 19,550 km, 26,070 km, and 32,590 km. Maximum effective 
horizontal ranges are ≈1,016 km, 1,121 km, 1,091 km, 1,160 km, and 1,120 km at altitudes of ≈21.43 km, 13.67 
km, 8.537 km, 6.829 km, and 4.52 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective ranges 
comprise ≈0.2617%, 0.0649%, 0.0278%, 0.0156% and 0.0098% of the maximum range. The critical intersection 
is encountered at firing angles of ≈1.152°, 0.648°, 0.396°, 0.288°, and 0.18°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range 
accuracy: 0.5 km. Note that due to the scale of this plot, the effective system range is not visible. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Source Power 
 
Figure 4.1.h: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Source Power 
For power levels of 10 GW, 30 GW, 50 GW, 70 GW, and 90 GW: Maximum horizontal ranges are ≈7,374 km, 12,770 
km, 16,490 km, 19,510 km, and 22,120 km at altitudes of ≈2,910 km, 5,040 km, 6,506 km, 7,698 km, and 8,728 
km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈8,745 km, 15,150 km, 19,550 km, 23,140 km, and 26,230 km. Maximum 
effective horizontal ranges are ≈1,049 km, 1,097 km, 1,091 km, 1,113 km, and 1,167 km at altitudes of ≈17.47 km, 
11.34 km, 8.537 km, 7.295 km, and 6.865 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective 
ranges comprise ≈0.1444%, 0.0472%, 0.0278%, 0.0198%, and 0.0154% of the maximum range. The critical 
intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈0.9°, 0.54°, 0.396°, 0.324°, and 0.288°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. 
Range accuracy: 0.5 km. Note that due to the scale of this plot, the effective system range is not visible. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.1.i: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Electromagnetic Shielding 
For electromagnetic shielding levels of 50 dB, 45 dB, 40 dB, 35 dB, and 30 dB: Maximum horizontal ranges are 
≈5,215 km, 9,273 km, 16,490 km, 29,320 km, and 52,150 km at altitudes of ≈2,058 km, 3,659 km, 6,506 km, 
11,570 km, and 20,570 km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈6,148 km, 11,000 km, 19,550 km, 34,770 km, and 
61,830 km. Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈1,028 km, 1,101 km, 1,091 km, 1,195 km, and 1,269 km at 
altitudes of ≈22.97 km, 15.53 km, 8.537 km, 4.756 km, and 1 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 
km. The effective ranges comprise ≈0.2941%, 0.0918%, 0.0278%, 0.0087%, and 0.0027% of the maximum range. 
The critical intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈1.224°, 0.756°, 0.396°, 0.18°, and 0°. Angular accuracy: 
0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. Note that due to the scale of this plot, the effective system range is not visible. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Critical Altitude 
 
Figure 4.1.j: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Critical Altitude 
For critical altitudes of 100 km, 125 km, 150 km, 175 km, and 200 km: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are 
≈1,091 km, 1,249 km, 1,332 km, 1,503 km, and 1,591 km at altitudes of ≈8.537 km, 11.21 km, 12.72 km, 16.11 
km, and 18 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈0.0278%, 0.0391%, 0.0511%, 0.0652%, and 0.0794% of the 
maximum range. The critical intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈0.396°, 0.468°, 0.504°, 0.576°, and 
0.612°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. Note that due to the scale of this plot, the effective 
system range is not visible. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Core Values (Enhanced) 
 
Figure 4.1.k: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Core Values (Enhanced) 
For the core values: The maximum effective horizontal range is ≈1,091 km at a vertical location of ≈8.537 km. 
The maximum effective vertical range is 100 km. The effective range comprises ≈0.0272% of the maximum 
range. The critical intersection is encountered at a firing angle of ≈0.396°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range 
accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Operating Frequency (Enhanced) 
 
Figure 4.1.l: Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” Plot - Sweeping Operating Frequency (Enhanced) 
For operating frequencies of 20 GHz, 40 GHz, 80 GHz, 100 GHz, and 140 GHz: Maximum effective horizontal 
ranges are ≈1,445 km, 1,406 km, 1,057 km, 1,091 km, and 1,055 km at altitudes of ≈1 km, 1 km, 13.62 km, 8.537 
km, and 22.22 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈0.5943%, 
0.1556%, 0.046%, 0.0278%, and 0.0173% of the maximum range. The critical intersection is encountered at 
firing angles of ≈0°, 0°, 0.684°, 0.396°, and 1.152°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
The plot in Figure 4.1.l depicts the “enhanced” plot for the effective coverage regions 
of GB-VM1 when sweeping operating frequency. Due to the extreme maximum ranges, the 
effective ranges are all quite similar and appear to be stacked on top of each other. This 
observation is the case for nearly all enhanced GB-VM1 plots. For this reason, the maximum 
effective horizontal ranges are explicitly detailed in the caption of each enhanced plot. 
113 
 
Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Antenna Diameter (Enhanced) 
 
Figure 4.1.m: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Antenna Diameter (Enhanced) 
For antenna diameters of 1 m, 2 m, 3 m, 4 m, and 5 m: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈1,016 km, 1,121 
km, 1,091 km, 1,160 km, and 1,120 km at vertical locations of ≈21.43 km, 13.67 km, 8.537 km, 6.829 km, and 4.52 
km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈0.2617%, 0.0649%, 
0.0278%, 0.0156% and 0.0098% of the maximum range. The critical intersection is encountered at firing angles 
of ≈1.152°, 0.648°, 0.396°, 0.288°, and 0.18°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Source Power (Enhanced) 
 
Figure 4.1.n: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Source Power (Enhanced) 
For power levels of 10 GW, 30 GW, 50 GW, 70 GW, and 90 GW: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈1,049 
km, 1,097 km, 1,091 km, 1,113 km, and 1,167 km at vertical locations of ≈17.47 km, 11.34 km, 8.537 km, 7.295 
km, and 6.865 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈0.1444%, 
0.0472%, 0.0278%, 0.0198%, and 0.0154% of the maximum range. The critical intersection is encountered at 
firing angles of ≈0.9°, 0.54°, 0.396°, 0.324°, and 0.288°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Electromagnetic Shielding (Enhanced) 
 
Figure 4.1.o: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Electromagnetic Shielding (Enhanced) 
For electromagnetic shielding levels of 50 dB, 45 dB, 40 dB, 35 dB, and 30 dB: Maximum effective horizontal 
ranges are ≈1,028 km, 1,101 km, 1,091 km, 1,195 km, and 1,269 km at vertical locationss of ≈22.97 km, 15.53 km, 
8.537 km, 4.756 km, and 1 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective ranges comprise 
≈0.2941%, 0.0918%, 0.0278%, 0.0087%, and 0.0027% of the maximum range. The critical intersection is 
encountered at firing angles of ≈1.224°, 0.756°, 0.396°, 0.18°, and 0°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 
0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” - Critical Altitude (Enhanced) 
 
Figure 4.1.p: Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Earth” Plot - Sweeping Critical Altitude (Enhanced) 
Effective ranges, for very large maximum ranges, take on the values of an Earth-centered circle with radius   
  , where   is the radius of the Earth and    is the critical altitude. For critical altitudes of 100 km, 125 km, 150 
km, 175 km, and 200 km: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈1,091 km, 1,249 km, 1,332 km, 1,503 km, 
and 1,591 km at vertical locations of ≈8.537 km, 11.21 km, 12.72 km, 16.11 km, and 18 km. The effective ranges 
comprise ≈0.0278%, 0.0391%, 0.0511%, 0.0652%, and 0.0794% of the maximum range. The critical intersection 
is encountered at firing angles of ≈0.396°, 0.468°, 0.504°, 0.576°, and 0.612°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range 
accuracy: 0.5 km. 
In Figure 4.1.l above, the critical intersection angle is 0° for both 20 GHz and 40 GHz. 
This observation is significant as it represents a unique case where the range of the system 
is continually in excess of the effective range and thus is maximally effective at all angles. 
This observation is confirmed by plot’s data. The maximum effective downrange for both 
20 GHz and 40 GHz is shown to be greater than the maximum effective downrange of the 
other subplots (1,117 kilometers versus 993.9 kilometers, 1,005 kilometers, and 980.8 
kilometers). The downrange of 1,117 kilometers is, in fact, the maximum downrange 
distance for critical and deployment altitudes of one-hundred and one kilometers 
respectively. This result can be confirmed using the equation for the maximum downrange 
distance, as defined in Eq. (3.3.nn), which gives a maximum possible downrange of 
                               . 
 “Downrange Surface” plots were generated for Vulnerability Model 1. As stated in 
Section 4.1.1.3, all surface plots are done as a function of operating frequency and one other 
parameter. “Downrange Surface” plots are shown below in Figure 4.1.q, Figure 4.1.r, and 
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Figure 4.1.s for the additional parameter of antenna diameter, source power, and 
electromagnetic shielding. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Downrange” - Frequency/Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.1.q: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Downrange" Plot - Frequency/Antenna Diameter  
Surface plot of an HPM System’s Downrange Distance at an Interception Altitude of 100 km as a Function of 
Operating Frequency and Antenna Diameter is shown. At lower frequencies, the atmosphere is nearly 
transparent to microwave radiation. Therefore, when the diameter is increased beyond a certain point, the 
maximum downrange distance levels off at 1128 km, representing the maximum distance achievable by a 
horizontally fired beam under an altitude of 100 km for a system stationed at an altitude of one kilometer. This 
value is limited by the curvature of the earth, and as such further improvements of an HPM system do not affect 
this value. Outside of this frequency range, however, atmospheric restrictions constrain the maximum range 
more heavily and allow less variation with antenna diameter. Coincidentally, this balances out to nearly the same 
downrange value as the physical limit presented by the curvature of the earth. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Downrange” - Frequency/Source Power 
 
Figure 4.1.r: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Downrange" Plot - Frequency/Source Power  
Surface plot of an HPM System’s Downrange Distance at an Interception Altitude of 100 km as a Function of 
Operating Frequency and Signal Power is shown. The relationship shown here is very similar to that shown in the 
previous figure.  At frequencies near to the resonant frequencies of oxygen, the atmosphere is nearly opaque to 
electromagnetic radiation. The downrange distances near this “60 GHz complex” are zero, as the beams are 
attenuated too heavily to reach the critical altitude. 
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Ground-Based - Model 1 - “Downrange” - Frequency/Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.1.s: Ground-Based - Model 1 - "Downrange" Plot - Frequency/Electromagnetic Shielding 
Surface plot of an HPM System’s Downrange Distance at an Interception Altitude of 100 km as a Function of 
Operating Frequency and Attenuation Due to Shielding is shown. At low frequencies, the maximum downrange 
distance is achieved for low levels of shielding attenuation. However, at higher levels, this range quickly drops off 
to much lower values.  
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4.1.3 Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 
The second Vulnerability Model considered for a ground-based HPM system was a 
moderately vulnerable target model. The core values of the ground-based Vulnerability 
Model 2 (GB-VM2) can be seen below in Table 4.1.c. GB-VM2 is nearly identical to GB-VM1 
with the exception of the required intensity on target, which increases to 10     from 
10-2    . 
Parameter Name Core Value Units 
Operating Frequency     [   ] 
Antenna Diameter   [ ] 
Source Power    [  ] 
Intensity on Target    [    ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding    [  ] 
Critical Altitude     [  ] 
Table 4.1.c: Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 (Moderately Vulnerable) - Core Values 
Vulnerability Model 2 was used to represent a highly moderately target model with a required intensity 
of         . In comparison to Vulnerability Model 1, all other parameters with the exception of intensity on 
target were held constant. 
The sweep limits for GB-VM2 can be seen below in Table 4.1.d. Again, all parameter 
sweeps attempt to predictably span a range near the core values with the exception of 
frequency. 
Parameter Name Sweep Values Units 
Operating Frequency [                ] [   ] 
Antenna Diameter [         ] [ ] 
Source Power [              ] [  ] 
Intensity on Target [   ] [    ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding [              ] [  ] 
Critical Altitude [                   ] [  ] 
Table 4.1.d: Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 (Moderately Vulnerable) - Sweep Values 
The Vulnerability Model 2 sweep values indicate the values used for each parameter sweep in “Earth” plots. For 
example, when sweeping operating frequency,      ,      ,      ,       , and        were used. 
122 
 
Using the case values, “Earth” plots were generated. The “Earth” plot for the core 
GB-VM2 values can be seen below in Figure 4.1.t. The maximum range of GB-VM2 extends 
to ≈521.5 kilometers horizontally at an altitude of ≈206.7 kilometers, while the maximum 
effective range reaches ≈466.1 kilometers at an altitude of ≈83.25 kilometers. 
Additional “Earth” plots for GB-VM2 which sweep the parameters of operating 
frequency, antenna diameter, source power, electromagnetic shielding, and critical altitude 
can be seen in Figure 4.1.u, Figure 4.1.v, Figure 4.1.w, Figure 4.1.x, and Figure 4.1.y 
respectively. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Earth” - Core Values 
 
Figure 4.1.t: Ground-Based HPM - Model 2 - "Earth” Plot - Core Values 
For core values: The maximum horizontal range is ≈521.5 km at a vertical location of ≈206.7 km. The maximum 
vertical range is ≈619.3 km. The maximum effective horizontal range is ≈466.1 km at an altitude of ≈83.25 km. 
The maximum effective vertical range is 100 km. The effective range comprises ≈18.52% of the maximum range. 
The critical intersection is encountered at a firing angle of ≈10.008°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 
0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Earth” - Operating Frequency 
 
Figure 4.1.u: Ground-Based HPM - Model 2 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Operating Frequency 
For operating frequencies of 20 GHz, 40 GHz, 80 GHz, 100 GHz, and 140 GHz: Maximum horizontal ranges are 
≈119 km, 224 km, 402.4 km, 521.5 km, and 665.3 km at vertical locations of ≈31.08 km, 73.63 km, 172.8 km, 
206.7 km, and 312 km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈129.8 km, 254.3 km, 488.9 km, 619.3 km, and 835.5 km. 
Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈119 km, 224 km, 375.4 km, 466.1 km, and 501.3 km at vertical 
locations of ≈31.08 km, 73.63 km, 89.39 km, 83.25 km, and 80.72 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 
100 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈87.06%, 48.52%, 24.71%, 18.52%, and 11.63% of the maximum range. 
The critical intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈50.184°, 23.292°, 13.248°, 10.008°, and 9.036°. 
Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Earth” - Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.1.v: Ground-Based HPM - Model 2 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Antenna Diameter 
For antenna diameters of 1 m, 2 m, 3 m, 4 m, and 5 m: Maximum horizontal ranges are ≈173.8 km, 347.6 km, 
521.5 km, 695.3 km, and 869.1 km at vertical locations of ≈69.57 km, 138.1 km, 206.7 km, 275.3 km, and 343.8 
km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈207.1 km, 413.2 km, 619.3 km, 825.4 km, and 1,032 km. Maximum effective 
horizontal ranges are ≈173.8 km, 338.3 km, 466.1 km, 564.8 km, and 640.3 km at vertical locations of ≈69.57 km, 
91.28 km, 83.25 km, 75.6 km, and 68.44 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The effective 
ranges comprise ≈58.9%, 30.35%, 18.52%, 12.38%, and 8.752% of the maximum range. The critical intersection 
is encountered at firing angles of ≈29.844°, 14.94°, 10.008°, 7.524°, and 6.012°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range 
accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Earth” - Source Power 
 
Figure 4.1.w: Ground-Based HPM - Model 2 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Source Power 
For source power levels of 10 GW, 30 GW, 50 GW, 70 GW, and 90 GW: Maximum horizontal ranges are ≈233.2 km, 
403.9 km, 521.5 km, 617 km, and 699.6 km at vertical locations of ≈92.99 km, 160.3 km, 206.7 km, 244.4 km, and 
277 km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈277.5 km, 479.9 km, 619.3 km, 732.6 km, and 830.5 km. Maximum 
effective horizontal ranges are ≈233.2 km, 383.4 km, 466.1 km, 524 km, and 567.3 km at vertical locations of 
≈92.99 km, 88.74 km, 83.25 km, 79.28 km, and 75.56 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 100 km. The 
effective ranges comprise ≈45.24%, 25.54%, 18.52%, 14.73%, and 12.27% of the maximum range. The critical 
intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈22.14°, 12.888°, 10.008°, 8.496°, and 7.488°. Angular accuracy: 
0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
127 
 
Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Earth” - Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.1.x: Ground-Based HPM - Model 2 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Electromagnetic Shielding 
For electromagnetic shielding levels of 50 dB, 45 dB, 40 dB, 35 dB, and 30 dB: Maximum horizontal ranges are 
≈164.9 km, 293.2 km, 521.5 km, 927.3 km, and 1,649 km at vertical locations of ≈66.05 km, 116.7 km, 206.7 km, 
366.8 km, and 651.5 km. Maximum vertical ranges are ≈196.5 km, 348.7 km, 619.3 km, 1,101 km, and 1,956 km. 
Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈164.9 km, 290.8 km, 466.1 km, 662.6 km, and 825.3 km at vertical 
locations of ≈66.05 km, 93.47 km, 83.25 km, 66.58 km, and 47.72 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are all 
100 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈61.71%, 36.38%, 18.52%, 7.889%, and 2.832% of the maximum range. 
The critical intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈31.536°, 17.64°, 10.008°, 5.652°, and 3.24°. Angular 
accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Earth” - Critical Altitude 
 
Figure 4.1.y: Ground-Based HPM - Model 2 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Critical Altitude 
For critical altitudes of 100 km, 125 km, 150 km, 175 km, and 200 km: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are 
≈466.1 km, 489.6 km, 504.7 km, 514.4 km, and 519.7 km at vertical locations of ≈83.25 km, 106.9 km, 130.6 km, 
155 km, and 179.7 km. The effective ranges comprise ≈18.52%, 24.19%, 29.73%, 35.09%, and 40.17% of the 
maximum range. The critical intersection is encountered at firing angles of ≈10.008°, 12.204°, 14.4°, 16.668°, and 
18.972°. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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“Downrange” plots were generated for GB-VM2. Again downrange distance and 
operating frequency were plotted against antenna diameter, source power, and 
electromagnetic shielding in Figure 4.1.z, Figure 4.1.aa, and Figure 4.1.bb respectively. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Downrange” - Frequency/Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.1.z: Ground-Based - Model 2 - "Downrange" Plot - Frequency/Antenna Diameter 
Surface plot of an HPM System’s Downrange Distance at an Interception Altitude of 100km as a Function of 
Operating Frequency and Attenuation Due to Shielding is shown. At very low frequencies, the atmosphere is 
nearly transparent to microwaves and as such the linear relationship of range to antenna diameter predicted by 
Eq. (3.1.m) can be seen. However, because of the non-linear effects of atmospheric attenuation, this relationship 
becomes less obvious at higher frequencies. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Downrange” - Frequency/Source Power 
 
Figure 4.1.aa: Ground-Based - Model 2 - "Downrange" Plot - Frequency/Source Power 
Surface plot of an HPM System’s Downrange Distance at an Interception Altitude of 100km as a Function of 
Operating Frequency and Power is shown. Downrange distance increases as a function of signal power. However, 
at high frequencies, the atmospheric attenuation constrains the maximum range much more heavily, so this 
relationship becomes much less obvious. 
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Ground-Based - Model 2 - “Downrange” - Frequency/Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.1.bb: Ground-Based - Model 2 - "Downrange" Plot - Frequency/Electromagnetic Shielding 
Surface Plot of an HPM System’s Downrange Distance at an Interception Altitude of 100km as a Function of 
Operating Frequency and Attenuation Due to Shielding As the amount of shielding attenuation by the target is 
increased, the maximum downrange distance of an HPM system drops off very quickly. There also exist several 
frequency ranges which are completely attenuated by the atmosphere, causing the downrange distance to drop 
to zero.  
133 
 
4.1.4 Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 
The third and final Vulnerability Model considered for a ground-based HPM system 
was a highly resistant target model. The core values of the ground-based Vulnerability 
Model 3 (GB-VM3) can be seen below in Table 4.1.e. GB-VM3 varies from both GB-VM1 and 
GB-VM2 in required intensity, which was increased to 100,000     from 10-2     
(GB-VM1) and 10     (GB-VM2), antenna diameter, which was increased to five meters 
from three meters, source power, which was increased to one-hundred gigawatts from fifty 
gigawatts, and electromagnetic shielding, which was decreased to thirty decibels from forty 
decibels. 
Parameter Name Core Value Units 
Operating Frequency     [   ] 
Antenna Diameter   [ ] 
Source Power     [  ] 
Intensity on Target         [    ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding    [  ] 
Critical Altitude     [  ] 
Table 4.1.e: Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 (Highly Resistant) - Core Values 
Vulnerability Model 3 was used to represents an invulnerable target model with a required intensity of 
100,000    . In comparison to Vulnerability Models 1 and 2, antenna diameter was increased to   , source 
power was increased to      , and electromagnetic shielding was decreased to      . All other parameters 
were held constant. 
The sweep limits for GB-VM3 can be seen below in Table 4.1.f. Again, all parameter 
sweeps attempt to predictably span a range near the core values with the exception of 
frequency. 
134 
 
Parameter Name Sweep Values Units 
Operating Frequency [                ] [   ] 
Antenna Diameter [         ] [ ] 
Source Power [               ] [  ] 
Intensity on Target [   ] [    ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding [              ] [  ] 
Critical Altitude [                   ] [  ] 
Table 4.1.f: Ground-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 (Highly Resistant) - Sweep Values 
The Vulnerability Model 3 sweep limits indicate the values used for each parameter sweep in “Earth” plots. For 
example, when sweeping operating frequency,      ,      ,      ,       , and        were used. 
Using the core values, “Earth” plots were generated. The “Earth” plot for the core 
GB-VM3 values can be seen below in Figure 4.1.cc. The maximum horizontal range of GB-
VM3 is ≈38.88 kilometers at an altitude of ≈16.11 kilometers. As the range fails to reach the 
critical altitude of 100 kilometers, the entire range is effective and, thus, shaded. 
Additionally, the critical firing angle is excluded from the plots as there is no minimum 
angle for which the range intersects with the critical altitude. 
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Ground-Based - Model 3 - “Earth” - Core Values 
 
Figure 4.1.cc: Ground-Based - Model 3 - "Earth" Plot - Core Values 
For core values: The maximum effective horizontal range is ≈38.88 km at a vertical location of ≈16.11 km. The 
maximum effective vertical range is 47.09 km. The effective range comprises ≈100% of the maximum range. 
Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 3 - “Earth” - Operating Frequency 
 
Figure 4.1.dd: Ground-Based - Model 3 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Operating Frequency 
For operating frequencies of 20 GHz, 40 GHz, 80 GHz, 100 GHz, and 140 GHz: Maximum effective horizontal 
ranges are ≈9.214 km, 17.28 km, 30.1 km, 38.88 km, and 49.59 km at vertical locations of ≈1.982 km, 4.635 km, 
13.14 km, 16.11 km, and 24.18 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are ≈10.61 km, 19.88 km, 37.37 km, 47.09 
km, and 63.2 km. The effective ranges all comprise ≈100% of the maximum range. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. 
Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 3 - “Earth” - Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.1.ee: Ground-Based - Model 3 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Antenna Diameter 
For antenna diameters of 1 m, 2 m, 3 m, 4 m, and 5 m: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are ≈8.249 km, 15.84 
km, 23.49 km, 31.16 km, and 38.88 km at vertical locations of ≈3.03 km, 19.43 km, 28.65 km, 37.87 km, and 47.09 
km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are ≈ km, km, km, km, and km. The effective ranges all comprise ≈100% of 
the maximum range. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 3 - “Earth” - Source Power 
 
Figure 4.1.ff: Ground-Based - Model 3 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Source Power 
For source power levels of 10 GW, 30 GW, 50 GW, 70 GW, and 90 GW: Maximum effective horizontal ranges are 
≈12.65 km, 19.67 km, 27.59 km, 33.7 km, and 38.88 km at vertical locations of ≈5.032 km, 7.997 km, 11.33 km, 
13.64 km, and 16.11 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are ≈15.58 km, 24.04 km, 33.59 km, 40.91 km, and 
47.09 km. The effective ranges all comprise ≈100% of the maximum range. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. Range 
accuracy: 0.5 km. 
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Ground-Based - Model 3 - “Earth” - Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.1.gg: Ground-Based - Model 3 - "Earth" Plot - Sweeping Electromagnetic Shielding 
For electromagnetic shielding levels of 50 dB, 45 dB, 40 dB, 35 dB, and 30 dB: Maximum effective horizontal 
ranges are ≈4.382 km, 7.397 km, 12.65 km, 22.05 km, and 38.88 km at vertical locations of ≈1.506 km, 2.238 km, 
5.032 km, 8.986 km, and 16.11 km. Maximum effective vertical ranges are ≈5.633 km, 9.238 km, 15.58 km, 26.92 
km, and 47.09 km. The effective ranges all comprise ≈100% of the maximum range. Angular accuracy: 0.036°. 
Range accuracy: 0.5 km.  
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An “Earth” plot sweeping critical altitude was not created for GB-VM3 as the core 
values do not reach the minimum critical altitude of 100 kilometers. 
“Downrange Surface” plots were not made for GB-VM3 since very few combinations 
of parameters resulted in system ranges achieving the minimum required altitude of 
      . The modifications to the critical altitude required to accommodate the low 
maximum ranges are either too varying or too great to depict presentable data; many 
configurations have maximum ranges of thirty kilometers or less and require a decision 
concerning a course of action to be made almost as soon as the threat can be detected. 
4.1.5 Coverage Maps 
Once a set of parameters is chosen based on the previous viewgraphs, a coverage 
map is made, as described in Section 3.3. These maps show the circular footprints of 
possible HPM systems placed at chosen latitudes and longitudes. The footprints are made 
assuming intercept altitudes of 100 kilometers, and are sized based on the assumption that 
atmosphere is constant in the area considered. This assumption will not be true, but 
numbers chosen are regional averages, and thus appropriate approximations. 
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Ground-Based - Coverage Map - Iran 
 
Figure 4.1.hh: Example Coverage Map of Four HPM Systems over Iran 
Though each system plotted has the same parameters, the size of each footprint varies because of the initial 
altitudes of the systems. Notice that the bottom footprint, which is placed at sea level, is much smaller than either 
the right or left footprints which are located well above sea level. This plot was made using the core values for 
Vulnerability Model 2. 
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Ground-Based - Coverage Map - North Korea 
 
Figure 4.1.ii: Example Coverage Map of One HPM System over North Korea 
This map shows that, using the core values for Vulnerability Model 2, only one system is needed for coverage of 
North Korea. Because of the geographic shape of this region, a circular footprint fits nicely around the country to 
provide full coverage. 
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Ground-Based - Coverage Map - North Korea (Alternate) 
 
Figure 4.1.jj: Example Coverage Map of Two HPM Systems over North Korea 
This coverage map is created using two HPM systems from Vulnerability Model 2, with the signal power reduced 
to nine gigawatts. Even with a lower than nominal power parameter, only a pair of systems is needed to provide 
full coverage over this country in this example case.  
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4.2 Space Basing  
As seen in Eqs. (3.4.b) through (3.4.h), the total number of satellites is a direct 
function of an HPM system’s range, orbital altitude, and an ICBM’s critical altitude. This 
relation is shown visually in Figure 4.2.a.  Table 4.0.a shows generalized range relations, 
which are exemplified for three separate Vulnerability Models in Sections 4.2.1 through 
4.2.3. All plots were created using MATLAB and have 100,000 sample points. 
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Space-Based - “Correlation” - Total Satellites/Maximum Range 
 
Figure 4.2.a: Space-Based - “Correlation” Plot - Total Satellites/Maximum Range 
Critical altitude of 100 kilometers. Orbital altitude of 600 kilometers.  Total satellites decreases in an exponential 
fashion against maximum range.  The relation is not continuous due to an integer number of satellites required 
per orbital ring and an integer number of orbital rings, creating a “step” like appearance as shown in the zoomed 
in portions of the figure.  Coordinate point represents the total satellites required for vulnerability model 2, the 
only vulnerability model that can be displayed on this scale.  
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4.2.1 Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 
The core values of the space-based Vulnerability Model 1 (SB-VM1) can be seen 
below in Table 4.2.a. SB-VM1 is primarily defined by lower bound of the intensity 
requirement to cause electrical damage as defined in "Effects of Directed Energy Weapons" 
(Nielsen, 1994). Using this lower intensity bound means that the target ICBM is highly 
vulnerable to electromagnetic attack. Shielding loss is defined by taking the upper bound of 
reasonable shielding ability for an ICBM (Cox, 1973). 
Parameter Name Core Value Units 
Operating Frequency      [   ] 
Antenna Diameter    [ ] 
Source Power     [  ] 
Intensity on Target       [   ⁄ ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding     [  ] 
Critical Altitude      [  ] 
Orbital Altitude      [  ] 
Table 4.2.a: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 (Highly Vulnerable) - Core Values 
Vulnerability Model 1 was used to represent a highly vulnerable target model with a required intensity 
of         . 
The sweep limits for SB-VM1 can be seen below in Table 4.2.b. 
Parameter Name Sweep Limits Units 
Operating Frequency [     ] [   ] 
Antenna Diameter [   ] [ ] 
Source Power [     ] [  ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding [    ] [  ] 
Table 4.2.b: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 (Highly Vulnerable) - Sweep Limits 
Vulnerability Model 1 sweep limits indicate the values used as bounds for each parameter sweep in “Correlation” 
plots. For example, when sweeping maximum range versus operating frequency, frequencies between      and 
       are shown on the independent axis. 
The results for SB-VM1 can be seen below in Table 4.2.c. 
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Result Name Value 
Maximum Range            
Satellites/Orbital Ring               
Total Orbital Rings         
Total Satellites               
Table 4.2.c: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 1 (Highly Vulnerable) - Summary Results 
Vulnerability Model 1 results in a single system range of          . This range necessitates 2 satellites in 1 
orbital ring resulting in 2 satellites to achieve global coverage. 
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Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” - Operating Frequency 
 
Figure 4.2.b: Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Operating Frequency 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 1 operating frequency core value.  Red line describes 
Vulnerability Model 1 shielding loss core value.  Maximum range increases linearly with operating frequency. 
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Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” - Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.2.c: Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Antenna Diameter 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 1 antenna diameter core value.  Red line describes 
Vulnerability Model 1 signal power core value.  Maximum range increases linearly with antenna diameter. 
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Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” - Source Power 
 
Figure 4.2.d: Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Source Power 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 1 signal power core value.  Red line describes Vulnerability 
Model 1 operating frequency core value.  Maximum range increases with the root of signal power. 
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Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” - Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.2.e: Space-Based - Model 1 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Electromagnetic Shielding 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 1 shielding loss core value.  Red line describes Vulnerability 
Model 2 antenna diameter core value.  Maximum range decreases exponentially with shielding loss.  
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4.2.2 Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 
The core values of the space-based Vulnerability Model 2 (SB-VM2) can be seen 
below in Table 4.2.d. This model is primarily defined by using the generalized intensity 
requirements to cause electrical damage as defined in a United States Air Force report 
(Crawford, Jordan, Kendall, Powers, & Varni, 1996). Using this intensity requirement, an 
ICBM is 1,000 times less vulnerable to electromagnetic attack as compared to SB-VM1 and 
for the purposes of analysis is referred to as being moderately vulnerable. Shielding loss is 
defined by taking the upper bound of reasonable shielding ability for an ICBM (Cox, 1973). 
Parameter Name Core Value Units 
Operating Frequency      [   ] 
Antenna Diameter    [ ] 
Source Power     [  ] 
Intensity on Target     [   ⁄ ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding     [  ] 
Critical Altitude      [  ] 
Orbital Altitude      [  ] 
Table 4.2.d: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 (Moderately Vulnerable) - Core Values 
Vulnerability Model 2 was used to represent a moderately vulnerable target model with a required intensity 
of       . 
The sweep limits for SB-VM2 can be seen below in Table 4.2.e. 
Parameter Name Sweep Limits Units 
Operating Frequency [     ] [   ] 
Antenna Diameter [   ] [ ] 
Source Power [     ] [  ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding [    ] [  ] 
Table 4.2.e: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 (Moderately Vulnerable) - Sweep Limits 
Vulnerability Model 2 sweep limits indicate the values used as bounds for each parameter sweep in “Correlation” 
plots. For example, when sweeping maximum range versus operating frequency, frequencies between      and 
       are shown on the independent axis. 
The results for SB-VM2 can be seen below in Table 4.2.f. 
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Result Name Value 
Maximum Range           
Satellites/Orbital Ring                
Total Orbital Rings           
Total Satellites                   
Table 4.2.f: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 2 (Moderately Vulnerable) - Summary Results 
Vulnerability Model 2 results in a single system range of         . This range necessitates 58 satellites in each of 
68 orbital rings, resulting in 3,944 satellites to achieve global coverage. 
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Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” - Operating Frequency 
 
Figure 4.2.f: Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Operating Frequency 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 2 operating frequency core value.  Red line describes 
Vulnerability Model 2 shielding loss core value.  Maximum range increases linearly with operating frequency. 
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Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” - Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.2.g: Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Antenna Diameter 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 2 antenna diameter core value.  Red line describes 
Vulnerability Model 2 signal power core value.  Maximum range increases linearly with antenna diameter. 
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Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” - Source Power 
 
Figure 4.2.h: Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Source Power 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 2 signal power core value.  Red line describes Vulnerability 
Model 2 operating frequency core value.  Maximum range increases with the root of signal power. 
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Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” - Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.2.i: Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Electromagnetic Shielding 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 2 shielding loss core value.  Red line describes Vulnerability 
Model 2 antenna diameter core value.  Maximum range decreases exponentially with shielding loss.  
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4.2.3 Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 
The core values of the space-based Vulnerability Model 3 (SB-VM3) can be seen 
below in Table 4.2.g. This model is primarily defined by using the intensity required to 
cause damage against targets not specifically vulnerable to microwave radiation as defined 
in "Effects of Directed Energy Weapons" (Nielsen, 1994).  SB-VM3 uses ideal parameters 
for an HPM system as described by operating at the highest frequency while remaining in 
microwave spectrum, a large antenna diameter, and a shielding loss       less than the 
upper bound of reasonable shielding ability for an ICBM (Cox, 1973). While using idealized 
system parameters, the high intensity required for a mission kill still makes target ICBMs 
extremely resistant to electromagnetic attack. 
Parameter Name Core Value Units 
Operating Frequency      [   ] 
Antenna Diameter 5 [ ] 
Source Power      [  ] 
Intensity on Target          [   ⁄ ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding     [  ] 
Critical Altitude      [  ] 
Orbital Altitude      [  ] 
Table 4.2.g: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 (Highly Resistant) - Core Values 
Vulnerability Model 3 was used to represent a highly resistant target model with a required intensity 
of            . 
The sweep limits for SB-VM3 can be seen below in Table 4.2.h. 
Parameter Name Sweep Limits Units 
Operating Frequency [     ] [   ] 
Antenna Diameter [   ] [ ] 
Source Power [     ] [  ] 
Electromagnetic Shielding [    ] [  ] 
Table 4.2.h: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 (Highly Resistant) - Sweep Limits 
Vulnerability Model 3 sweep limits indicate the values used as bounds for each parameter sweep in “Correlation” 
plots. For example, when sweeping maximum range versus operating frequency, frequencies between      and 
       are shown on the independent axis. 
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The results for SB-VM3 can be seen below in Table 4.2.i. 
Result Name Value 
Maximum Range           
Satellites/Orbital Ring             
Total Orbital Rings             
Total Satellites             
Table 4.2.i: Space-Based - Vulnerability Model 3 (Highly Resistant) - Summary Results 
Vulnerability Model 3 results in a single system range of         . This range fails to reach the critical altitude 
from the model’s orbital altitude, thus no coverage be insured in this scenario. 
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Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” - Operating Frequency 
 
Figure 4.2.j: Space-Based - Model 2 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Operating Frequency 
Dashed vertical line would describe Vulnerability Model 3 operating frequency core value; however, the core 
value exists at the end of the microwave spectrum (300 GHz) so it is not visible.  Red line describes Vulnerability 
Model 3 shielding loss core value.  Maximum range increases linearly with operating frequency. 
161 
 
Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” - Antenna Diameter 
 
Figure 4.2.k: Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Antenna Diameter 
Dashed vertical line would describe Vulnerability Model 3 antenna diameter core value; however, the core value 
exists at the end of the maximum range (5 meters) so it is not visible. Red line describes Vulnerability Model 3 
signal power core value.  Maximum range increases linearly with antenna diameter. 
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Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” - Source Power 
 
Figure 4.2.l: Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Source Power 
Dashed vertical line would describe Vulnerability Model 3 signal power core value; however, the core value 
exists at the end of the maximum range (100 gigawatts) so it is not visible. Red line describes Vulnerability Model 
3 operating frequency core value.  Maximum range increases with the root of signal power. 
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Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” - Electromagnetic Shielding 
 
Figure 4.2.m: Space-Based - Model 3 - “Correlation” Plot - Maximum Range/Electromagnetic Shielding 
Dashed vertical line describes Vulnerability Model 3 shielding loss core value. Red line describes Vulnerability 
Model 3 antenna diameter core value. Maximum range decreases exponentially with shielding loss. 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Parameter Relations 
The relationships described in this section focus only on a system’s maximum 
vacuum range (    ) and not its effective downrange distance since the latter is only 
applicable for ground-based systems. 
5.1.1 Antenna Diameter 
For the purposes of analysis, a circular antenna is assumed. Different antenna 
geometries may produce different results by changing the area cross section of the beam; 
however, the general relations would remain the same. An increase in the diameter of the 
antenna corresponds to a linear increase in the maximum range of a system. 
5.1.2 Signal Power 
The signal power of the HPM systems considered in this analysis varies from 1-100 
gigawatts. Although power levels in the terawatt range are reportedly achievable in the 
near future (Fulghum, 2007), this report is concerned only with currently available 
technology and does not investigate such systems of such power. An HPM system’s 
maximum range increases with the positive square root of the power. As such, a fourfold 
increase in the signal power would double the system’s range. 
5.1.3 Operating Frequency 
The frequency of the beam fired by an HPM system has the least obvious 
relationship with the maximum range. In a vacuum, such as with satellite-based systems, 
the maximum range increases linearly with increasing frequency, similar to the 
relationship with antenna diameter. However, because of atmospheric attenuation’s 
frequency dependence, ground-based systems do not have an obvious relationship 
between maximum range and operating frequency. In general, the atmosphere’s effects on 
a system increase in strength with increasing frequency. However, this relationship is non-
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linear, and the attenuation level spikes at the resonant frequency of oxygen, which is 
around 60 GHz. Thus, despite a general increase in a system’s range with increases in 
operating frequency, the rate is less than linear, and for frequencies near 60 GHz the range 
is significantly decreased. 
5.1.4 Electromagnetic Shielding 
A target’s electromagnetic shielding produces a difficult challenge for an HPM 
system to overcome. Although 40 dB is considered an upper limit for ICBMs (Cox, 1973), 
this report takes a conservative approach and varies this value from 30-50 dB, extending 
ten decibels beyond the reported upper limit. The range of an HPM system varies with the 
negative exponential of the target’s electromagnetic shielding. As such, a ten decibel 
increase corresponds to nearly an order of magnitude decrease in a system’s range. 
5.1.5 Required Intensity on Target 
The maximum range of an HPM system varies with the ratio of the signal power to 
the required intensity. As such, an increase in the required intensity can be canceled out 
with an equivalent increase in the system’s signal power, leaving the maximum range 
unchanged. However, the range of intensities extends nine orders of magnitude, varying 
from one milliwatt per square meter up to one megawatt per square meter. This spread of 
values is so great that moving from one end of the spectrum to the other results in system 
ranges varying from tens to tens of thousands of kilometers. 
5.1.6 Atmospheric Considerations 
For the purposes of this analysis, atmospheric conditions were calculated from 
regional yearly averages. As an exception, relative humidity was taken as a yearly high for 
the region considered, providing more conservative range estimates. Additionally, rainfall 
and cloud coverage were not considered in analysis. Each of these two factors can 
significantly reduce the range of a ground-based HPM system. 
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Additionally, the angle of fire has a significant impact on the total attenuation 
experienced along the HPM beam’s path to target. 
 
Figure 5.1.a: Distance traveled within atmosphere as a Function of Angle 
At different angles of fire, a beam travels different distances within the atmosphere, and is attenuated by 
different amounts. A beam fired at 50° is only within the atmosphere for 23.4 kilometers and is attenuated by 
about 1.02 dB, whereas a horizontally fired beam travels a distance of 479.5 kilometers within the atmosphere 
and is attenuated by the much greater amount of        . 
 
5.2 Ground-Based Systems 
For both Vulnerability Models 1 and 2, High-Powered Microwave systems form a 
promising method for missile defense. Vulnerability Model 1 shows that for highly 
vulnerable targets (which correspond to a required intensity of        ⁄ ), an HPM 
system is highly effective and is range limited by the curvature of the Earth. For this model, 
any number of parameters considered which positively affect the effective range of a 
system, with the exception of operating frequency, can be decreased by an order of 
magnitude or more while still maintaining the ability to cover entire countries with just 
one system. Although operating frequency is shown to positively affect the maximum 
vacuum range of a system, as defined in Eq. (3.1.m), its effects on ground-based systems, 
which must fire through the atmosphere, are more difficult to qualify. If operational 
frequencies near 60 GHz and other peaks of high attenuation shown in Figure 2.4.c are 
approached, the maximum system range of a ground-based system, as defined in Eq. 
(3.3.ee), is attenuated heavily. As the peaks of high atmospheric attenuation are related to 
frequency non-linearly, it is not possible to generalize the effect of frequency for the 
maximum system range of ground-based system. This effect is confirmed by the surface 
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figures shown in Section 4.1.2; it is clear to see that beyond 100 GHz there is no significant 
gain in system range, so considerations beyond this frequency offer little benefit. 
Vulnerability Model 2 shows that for the intensity threshold defining most 
commercial electronic devices (     ⁄ ) (Crawford, Jordan, Kendall, Powers, & Varni, 
1996), an HPM system achieves ranges large enough to provide ground-based coverage of 
most smaller countries such as Iran and North Korea, providing locations close in 
proximity to the country of concern are available to the United States military. These values 
are all within system parameter limits based on background research of unclassified 
sources. From Figure 4.1.hh through Figure 4.1.jj, it is clear to see that, for the core values 
considered, only a few well-designed HPM systems are needed to provide protection 
against smaller countries. However, such systems are unable to reach the interior of 
countries like Russia or China. 
Vulnerability Model 3 represents a highly resistant threat model and corresponds to 
an intensity of            ⁄ . Effective down ranges are well below those necessary for 
coverage over most countries. Using model three, high-powered microwave systems would 
require a significant technological advancement for practical ranges to be realized. 
It is important to note a few key characteristics of the three-dimensional surface 
plots in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. The plots show an intersection of the downrange distance 
with an altitude of       . Therefore, different maximum ranges correspond to different 
beam look angles. For instance, a beam with a very small range that barely reaches an 
altitude of        would have to fire almost vertically, while a beam of infinite range can 
fire horizontally. Because of these different firing angles, each maximum range also 
corresponds to different levels of attenuation, since this value is dependent on the amount 
of distance traveled within the first       of atmosphere. As such, an improvement in the 
system’s parameters does not improve the maximum effective downrange distance as 
much as it increases the un-attenuated maximum range.  
Since shorter ranges must fire more vertically, beams corresponding to these ranges 
travel less distance in the lower region of the atmosphere and are attenuated by lesser 
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amounts than longer-ranged systems. As such, for some frequencies, increases in system 
parameters are almost entirely offset by the increased level of attenuation. This effect 
explains some of the more level sections of these plots, and presents a problem when trying 
to find a general rule of thumb to follow. 
5.3 Space-Based Systems 
Table 4.0.a outlines a hard truth in High-Powered Microwave (HPM) design for 
space basing.  There exist two compounding negative exponential effects (intensity 
required on target and attenuation due to target shielding or the atmosphere) on an HPM 
system's range, while the factors that positively influence range (operating frequency, 
antenna diameter, and power) have influences that are linear at best. 
5.3.1 Vulnerability Models 
Vulnerability Model 1 (Section 4.2.1) showed that large ranges are achieved with 
modest system parameters.  Only two satellites are needed in Vulnerability Model 1 to 
guarantee continuous full Earth coverage. However, the exceptionally large range of the 
HPM system and the extremely low intensity requirement of model one highlighted that 
model one did not represent reasonable assumptions for system parameters. 
Vulnerability Model 2 (Section 4.2.2) showed that while an HPM system operates 
assuming the target intensity requirements as described by the United States Air Force 
report (Crawford, Jordan, Kendall, Powers, & Varni, 1996), and while maintaining modest 
system parameters, that a functional system is possible.  However, Vulnerability Model 2 
would require close to 2,000 satellites in orbit in order to guarantee continuous full Earth 
coverage. A system requiring thousands of satellites is not considered a reasonable 
solution. 
Vulnerability Model 3 (Section 4.2.3) showed that a functional system would require 
significant advances in technology to operate successfully.  The intensity required on target 
severely limits the HPM system’s range, to the point at which no coverage can be 
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guaranteed because it fails the bounding test, shown in Eq. (B.e), which checks if the range 
of an HPM system is capable of reaching the critical altitude from its orbital altitude. 
5.4 Collateral Damage Considerations 
Since satellite-based HPM systems will be firing electromagnetic radiation towards 
the ground from distance of several hundred kilometers, the diverged beam will continue 
past the target, through the atmosphere, and possibly reach the ground. This divergence 
could cause a collateral damage to electronic equipment. The satellites could be disabled or 
disrupted, and electronics on the ground as well as aircraft in flight could be affected. To 
limit the collateral damage caused electronics within the atmosphere, space-based HPM 
systems can be operated at the 60 GHz complex (see section 2.4.3), as most of the radiation 
will be attenuated too heavily by the atmosphere to cause any damage.  
Ground-based systems too have the potential to cause collateral damage. Emitting a 
high level of radiation beyond their target and into space, satellites in orbit may be 
irradiated and disabled. Furthermore, waves refracted by the atmosphere could cause 
damage to ground-based instruments as well. 
5.5 Limitations 
Analysis of HPM systems was done using two key assumptions. The first key 
assumption was that the propagation time from the HPM weapon to its target is 
instantaneous. For most practical considerations this assumption is appropriate as the 
wave propagates at the speed of light. However, this assumption may not be appropriate if 
an HPM system were firing over tens of thousands of miles to a target as the target may 
have to be led by several tenths of a second. Being as ICBMs travel at rates of several 
kilometers per second, this speed can translate into missing a target by a large spatial (but 
not temporal) margin. Target acquisition and tracking is not examined in MECSTAR HPM 
coverage analysis. 
The second key assumption was that the time required for an HPM system to 
mission kill a target ("stare time") is instantaneous. Again, for most practical 
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considerations this assumption is appropriate as current HPM devices require 
nanoseconds to successfully disable electronic equipment. Further investigation is needed 
in determining the actual stare time required for an HPM system that targets ICBMs, as well 
as the time needed after firing for the system to “rest” before it can fire again. 
The ability of two or more beams to focus on a single target simultaneously also 
merits investigation. If this method were to prove effective, it would then be possible to 
have a higher quantity of less advanced HPM systems, easing the constraints on 
technological capabilities. 
Ground basing and space basing results each have their own constraints. Ground 
basing analysis was done in a regional context, as opposed to a global context in the case of 
space basing. Modeling the number of ground stations required for full Earth coverage is 
impossible due to political borders. The irregularity of political borders also prevented the 
creation of an automated coverage calculator. This irregularity means that though ranging 
is calculated dynamically by MECSTAR, ground station locations must be specified 
manually and checked against the coverage of other ground stations to insure coverage 
against a given region. 
Space basing is done in a continuous global coverage context only. The method used 
for calculating satellite based coverage (see Section 3.4) is inappropriate for calculating 
regional coverage. The method works because the temporal component due to non-
stationary orbits is removed by assuming a continuous coverage blanket. A regional-only 
coverage requirement would remove the simplifications used to calculate global coverage 
because it would re-introduce the time dimension to the analysis. Satellite position and 
coverage zone as a function of time would have to be calculated because continuous 
coverage would no longer be an assumption. 
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6 Conclusions 
The main uncertainty within this research is the level of intensity required to 
disrupt the navigational system of an ICBM. Since this value is one of the most influential in 
defining the range of an HPM system due to its negative relation, the feasibility of HPM 
systems range from trivial to requiring significant technological advancements, as the 
intensity requirement ranges in value from low to high. 
Feasibility for space basing depends on a system designer’s criteria for a reasonable 
number of orbital platforms. However, due to the strong inverse relation between an HPM 
system’s range and the number of required platforms, general criteria can be laid out. In 
order to get the number of required platforms to less than 50, an HPM system must have a 
range of several thousand kilometers. Currently, the technology for such a system, while 
using non-trivial ICBM vulnerability models, is lacking. 
For both vulnerability models one and two, ground based HPM systems shows 
promising results. Less than 5 ground based stations are needed to provide negate an ICBM 
threat from small nations such as Iran or North Korea.  
Addressing the third vulnerability model in both the space and ground based 
scenarios, is well beyond the technological and logistical ability for any nation. As such, 
further investigation is required in determining the actual intensity level required for a 
mission kill. 
In summary, though current vulnerability models show promise in the case of 
ground basing, further research is necessary to in order to quantify an ICBM’s actual in-
flight response to various levels of applied microwave radiation. 
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Appendix A: Equilateral Hexagon Proof 
 
Figure A.a: “Hexagonal” Fit of Coverage Intersection 
The constant ‘C’ is the circumference of an arbitrary cross section of the critical 
surface sphere,   , that passes through the origin. 
              (A.a) 
The value ‘U’ is a special case of the abbreviated projected arc,   ; the case in which 
   is defined as an arc length starting from the center of   and terminates at the midpoint 
of an edge which contains the orbital path (as opposed to an arbitrary edge). This value is 
approximated by temporarily treating   as a plane and also by treating the projected arc, 
  , as a line length instead of an arc length. This approximation is valid for as long as the 
curvature of    is small as compared to the localized area   occupies. 
             (A.b) 
The value ‘  ’ is the arc length between the two vertices on   of which are the 
furthest apart. 
        (A.c) 
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The value ‘  ’ is an arc length between the vertices that describe an edge that 
contains the orbital path. This value is approximated in the same manner as ‘U.’ 
                (A.d) 
The values of         ,       , and       are allowed to be fractions in this special 
proof so that relation of    to the total number of satellites is continuous and differentiable. 
          
 
 
 (A.e) 
        
 
     
 (A.f) 
                         (A.g) 
       
 
 
 
 
     
 (A.h) 
Substituting in values to relate       to    is shown below. 
           
 
          
 
 
                 
 (A.i) 
           
  
    
                     
 (A.j) 
           
  
    
  
 
                   
 (A.k) 
To find the value of    that relates to the lowest      ,       is differentiated with 
respect to    and then solved for when the differentiated function equals 0. 
             
   
 
  
    
 
                         
            
 (A.l) 
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               (A.m) 
 
Figure A.b: Total Satellites versus Hexagonal Angle 
Local minima at   =300. Value of       is arbitrary. 
Figure A.a is redrawn below with        and the consequential angles by again 
approximating the   locale as a plane. 
 
Figure A.c: Equilateral “Hexagon” 
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Appendix B: Background Space Methods Calculations 
     √            (B.a) 
      √        (         )
 
 (B.b) 
The x-value of the intersection of the equations      and      is    (     ). Eq. 
(B.c) sets      and      equal to each other to solve for   . As shown in Eq. (B.d), the 
projected radius (   in km) is a function of   , and consequently of critical altitude 
(        ), radius of Earth (        ), orbiting altitude (        ), and maximum effective 
range (          ). 
   
       
        
         
 
         
 (B.c) 
         (B.d) 
A consequence of    being the intersection of      and      is that there must be a 
bounds check to see if the intersection exists at all. Eq. (B.e) describes the bounding check 
taken to insure intersection. 
             {
                        
                                          
 (B.e) 
Intersection is true if the orbital altitude, minus the maximum range, is less than the radius 
of Earth plus the critical altitude, as these are the adjacent radial extrema of the circles 
     and     . 
If an intersection exists,    and    are used to calculate the projected arc (        ).   
Because   ,   , and the origin of Earth form a right triangle as shown in Figure 3.4.a, the 
angle   is found by using the arctangent function, as shown in Eq. (B.f).  Once   is solved,    
is found using the equation to calculate arc length, as shown in Eq. (B.g). 
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       (
  
  
)  (B.f) 
             (B.g) 
The abbreviated projected arc,   , is roughly a scalar multiple of   , and is 
approximated using Pythagorean's theorem in the geometry described in Figure 3.4.d and 
below in Eq. (B.h). 
   
√ 
 
   (B.h) 
With    known, Eq. (3.4.a) is applied to calculate the maximum satellite spacing. 
